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This thesis aims to assess the role of human behaviors in the management of extreme 
hydrological events. Using an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach, three specific issues 
associated with modeling human behaviors are addressed: (1) behavioral heterogeneity, (2) social 
interaction, and (3) the interplay of multiple behaviors. The modeling approach is applied to two 
types of extreme hydrological events: floods and droughts.  
In the case of flood events, an ABM is developed to simulate heterogeneous responses to 
flood warnings and evacuation decisions. The ABM is coupled with a traffic model to simulate 
evacuation processes on a transportation network in an impending flood event. Based on this 
coupled framework, the model further takes account of social interactions, in the form of 
communication through social media, and evaluates how social interactions affect flood risk 
awareness and evacuation processes.  
The case of drought events considers a hypothetical agricultural water market based on 
double auction. Farmers’ multiple behaviors (irrigation and bidding behaviors) are modeled in an 
ABM framework. The impacts of the interplay of these behaviors on water market performance 
are evaluated under various hydrological conditions.  
The results from the ABMs show that the three aforementioned aspects of human behaviors 
can significantly affect the effectiveness of the management policies in extreme hydrological 
events. The thesis highlights the importance of including human behaviors for policy design in 
flood and drought management. Further, the thesis emphasizes the efforts in collecting empirical 
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Chapter I. Introduction  
1.1 Problem Overview  
Management and planning policies in water resource systems require a comprehensive 
understanding of both natural systems and human behaviors in response to the natural systems. In 
light of this, coupled human and natural systems (CHNS) have been recognized as an important 
modeling concept for simulating the interaction and coevolution between natural systems and 
humans [Liu et al., 2007a], and understanding human decision making is important for effective 
policy designs in water resource  planning and management [Liu et al., 2007b; O’Connell and 
O’Donnell, 2014].  
Although human behaviors play an important role in water resource systems, modeling 
human decisions is challenging, especially when data related to human cognitive processes that 
drive their decision-making are lacking. Two approaches for simulating human behaviors have 
been used: (1) optimization-based approaches and (2) rule-based approaches [Hu, 2015]. 
Optimization-based approaches simulate humans as utility optimizers, whose decisions are optimal 
ones based on the current available information for decision making [Yang et al., 2012; Hu et al., 
2015]. Given that the information available for decision making are often not sufficient, 
optimization-based approaches typically can only represent ideal decisions and might not 
completely capture the empirical decision making process. On the other hand, rule-based 
approaches assume human behaviors follow some intuitive if-then decision rules [An, 2012]. Rule-
based approaches are generally intuitive and easy to understand. However, derivation of such rules 
requires large amount of empirical data and comprehensive understanding of human cognitive 





To address the challenges associated with modeling human behaviors in water resource 
systems, agent-based modeling (ABM) has been widely applied in various disciplines [Heath et 
al., 2009; Villamor et al., 2012; Buchmann et al., 2016]. Unlike top-down approaches, such as 
optimization, which assume centralized control of decision-making processes, ABM takes a 
bottom-up approach in which each component in the system is simulated as an autonomous, 
interdependent, and adaptive agent with heterogeneous attributes and decision rules [Bonabeau, 
2002; Macy and Willer, 2002]. This feature makes ABMs suitable for simulating autonomous and 
adaptive decision-units in complex systems [Farmer and Foley, 2009]. However, simulating such 
complex systems can be quite computationally expensive, which has been a constraint to the 
application of ABM in complex systems during the past decade. Recently, with more advanced 
high-performance computing technologies (e.g., parallel and cloud computing), ABM has been 
more widely applied to simulating human behaviors in many research domains, including water 
resource systems. Studies include, but are not limited to, irrigation behaviors in agricultural 
systems [Ng et al., 2011; Miro, 2012; Hu et al., 2015], social response to flood warning and 
evacuation during flood events [Chen and Zhan, 2008; Dawson et al., 2011],  and economic 
behaviors in water resource markets [Zhang et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013]. 
These studies have demonstrated the usefulness of ABM in simulating human behaviors and have 
provided insights to guide planning and management policies in water resource systems.  
Despite the efforts to take account of the role of human behaviors in water resource 
systems, issues remain in simulating human behaviors. Among them, the following three issues 
have been recognized as important ones. First, given that agents’ decision rules might vary, it is 
important to represent heterogeneity in human behaviors, and evaluate whether and how 





Leuthold, 2000; Huang et al., 2013]. Second, agents’ decisions in the face of uncertainty rely on 
available information. Since social communication can greatly affect information exchange and 
thus agents’ decision-makings, it is important to evaluate how social communication affects human 
behaviors [Baumann et al., 1997]. Third, for a complex system in which multiple factors affect 
system outcomes, simulating multiple behaviors is needed. Thus, it is important to investigate how 
the interplay of multiple behaviors affect the modeling results [An, 2012; Ye and Mansury, 2016].  
Driven by these research needs, this thesis specifically investigates the aforementioned 
three issues in modeling human behaviors: (1) behavioral heterogeneity, (2) social interaction, and 
(3) interplay of multiple behavioral parameters. We will demonstrate the importance of taking 
account of these issues during extreme hydrological events, namely flood and drought.   
1.2 Research Objectives and Thesis Outline 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate how behavioral heterogeneity, social interaction, and 
the interplay of multiple behaviors affect modeling results in water resource systems. We use the 
flood warning-response system as a case study for simulating human behavioral heterogeneity and 
social interaction during flooding events. The agricultural water market, an example for drought 
events, is used for simulating the interplay of multiple behaviors. Specific objectives and outlines 
of the thesis are summarized as follows.   
(1) In Chapter II, an ABM framework is developed to simulate human behavioral 
heterogeneity in response to flood warnings. The framework is coupled with a traffic 
model to simulate agents’ evacuation processes within a road network under various 
flood-warning scenarios. The coupled model is used to evaluate the impacts of human 
behavioral heterogeneity on the benefits of flood warnings. 





social communication affects agents’ flood risk awareness and evacuation behaviors. 
In particular, social communication through social media and the influence of 
neighbor’s actions are evaluated in this section.  
(3) Chapter IV addresses the issues of simulating multiple behaviors, using drought as a 
case study. The ABM developed in this chapter explicitly incorporates farmers’ 
multiple behaviors, namely irrigation behavior (represented by farmers’ sensitivity to 
soil water deficit) and bidding behavior (represented by farmers’ rent seeking and 
learning rate), in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. The joint 
impacts of the behavioral parameters on the water market are evaluated under different 
hydrological conditions.  
(4) Chapter V summarizes the major findings and insights from present work, discusses 







Chapter II. Impacts of Human Behavioral Heterogeneity on the Benefits of Flood Warnings  
This chapter proposes an ABM framework to evaluate the impacts of human behavioral 
heterogeneity on the benefits of flood warnings. Section 2.1 introduces the objective of this study 
and some background information, followed with a detailed literature review in Section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 provides a detailed description of the methodology of this study, including how the 
agent-based modeling framework is set up and how it is coupled with the traffic model. The 
coupled model is tested by a hypothetical case study in Section 2.3 and the preliminary results 
are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes the main findings of this study and 
proposes some future work.  
2.1 Introduction 
 Flooding is a common weather disaster in the United States (U.S.) that has caused 
significant social and economic loss [Smith and Matthews, 2015].  Flood warnings have been 
shown to be effective in reducing flood-related deaths and economic loss from flood damages 
[Estrela et al., 2001]. Some studies suggest that as little as one hour of lead time can reduce flood 
damages by 10-20%, with potential savings of $1.62 billion annually in the U.S. [National 
Hydrologic Warning Council, 2002]. Additionally, many case studies around the world have 
reported the impact of early flood warning systems on saving human lives [Golnaraghi et al., 
2008]. 
 Flood warning systems, which have often been described as a combination of tools and 
processes embedded in different institutional, organizational, and infrastructure systems, are 
composed of (1) knowledge-based modeling and forecasting of flooding, (2) a monitoring and 





response. It is argued that the effectiveness of these systems is often rooted in the accuracy of the 
forecast, the lead time of the warning, and stakeholder’s understanding of how the risk is translated 
and interpreted by the public, which ultimately will translate into direct actions. Naturally, a 
considerable amount of research and development has focused on providing flood warnings that 
have both high prediction accuracy and sufficient warning lead time [Krzysztofowicz, 1996; 
Siccardi et al., 2005; Verkade and Werner, 2011]. Recent advances in predictions have allowed 
the public to obtain more reliable information in a timely manner, and longer time for planning 
and strategizing by emergency responders [Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009; Golding, 2009; 
Arheimer et al., 2011].  
Nevertheless, improvements in these areas do not reduce risk in disaster situations as 
reliable and timely warnings do little good if not followed by (early) actions. Research has 
demonstrated that people’s behavior during disaster events can have major impacts on the 
effectiveness of emergency response and evacuation plans [Starcke and Brand, 2012; Durage et 
al., 2014]. These studies have had limited consideration of how human’s heterogeneous response 
to flood warnings affect the evacuation processes (i.e., considering how people respond differently 
to flood warnings). There is a need for a more comprehensive understanding of how human 
evacuation processes are affected by interpretations of flood warning information and, ultimately, 
how these translate into actions [Dash and Gladwin, 2007]. 
 Evacuation decision-making processes are complex and uncertain. This is especially true 
when one tries to understand human cognition processes under disaster situations, which are 
affected by risk aversion, interpretation of warning systems, preparedness and education on 
evacuation procedures, etc. [Dash and Gladwin, 2007]. Moreover, to understand how human 





of households (e.g., residential location, access to evacuation transportation, previous experiences 
with floods, etc.) that affect all stages of evacuation processes. Considering all of these human 
behavioral and social-economic factors and their heterogeneities has often been identified as one 
of the primary challenges for effective flood-warning systems [Pan et al., 2007; Dawson et al., 
2011].  
Considerations such as what level of warning and/or with how much lead time the warning 
should be issued are critical to the effectiveness of flood warning systems. Earlier lead times have 
not proven to necessarily reduce the level of flood damages or loss of life, as the uncertainty with 
the forecast at those times is often quite high [Schröter et al., 2008]. At the same time, people have 
different risk aversion aptitudes that create difficulty in understanding what level of warning 
should be issued. High-risk warnings with high uncertainty could result in loss of trust in the flood 
warning system, while a low risk warning can result in catastrophic consequences if people’s risk 
aversion levels are above it. Thus, there is a need for a framework that allows for a better 
understanding of how the heterogeneity of response to flood warnings influences the effectiveness 
of flood warning systems 
This study proposes an agent-based modeling framework to incorporate human behavioral 
heterogeneity in flood warning-response systems. The objective is to test the hypothesis that the 
benefits of flood warnings will vary depending on heterogeneous responses to flood warnings. 
Furthermore, this study also explores the relationships between the benefits of flood warnings and 
residential density of flood zones. This will improve the understanding of priorities in developing 
evacuation plans for a specific community, and provide insights that will allow for more effective 





2.2 Literature Review  
Previous studies that explored the effects of human behaviors on the benefits of flood 
warnings mainly focused on gathering empirical data, often through surveys [Zhang et al., 2007; 
Lazo et al., 2010; Starcke and Brand, 2012], or simulated the evacuation process using a complex 
mathematical model representing human rationale [Ferrell, 1983]. These studies have mostly 
concentrated on exploring the effectiveness of different evacuation plans under different flooding 
and traffic scenarios. These studies allow the inclusion of traffic dynamics on different road 
networks, and explicit modeling of rules that mimic human rationale and adaptability during 
emergencies, and they have enabled a better understanding of which factors influence the 
effectiveness of evacuation procedures. For example, Dawson et al. [2011] integrated a dynamic 
agent-based model with a hydrodynamic model and a traffic model, with the objective of 
understanding the probability of an individual being exposed to flood under different storm surge 
conditions and warning lead times. The results of the study demonstrated that the number of people 
exposed to dangerous water depths increases monotonically as the storm surge height increases 
and as the warning time becomes shorter. For a case study in the United Kingdom,  there was 
almost a fourfold reduction in the number of agents exposed to flood when an effective flood 
warning system is used that considers the dynamics of the decision-making processes and 
consequential behaviors within the transportation system. 
 Among the studies that have explored the value of the warning information as a function 
of its own attributes is the analysis presented by [Schröter et al., 2008]. This study analyzed the 
effectiveness and efficiency of an early warning system for flash floods. By using historical data 
in two river basins, the authors analyzed the relationship between the reliability of information and 





compared the benefits and costs associated with using an early warning system as a function of the 
warning lead time. The authors found that longer lead times did not necessarily result in larger 
benefits as the reliability of the information at these times was often low. Finally, the study 
concluded that among the main factor that affects the effectiveness of the warning systems was 
stakeholder awareness, and that perhaps this was as important as improvements in flood forecast 
accuracy. 
Similarly, Verkade and Werner [2011] assessed the cost-benefit ratio of providing flood 
warning information. Using a case study in White Cart Water in Glasgow, UK, the authors 
presented a framework to estimate the flood risk reduction when using flood forecasting, warning, 
and response systems. Using a hydro-economic model of expected annual damage due to flooding, 
combined with the concept of Relative Economic Value (REV), the method was able to estimate 
the benefits associated with reduction in flood losses while considering the cost of providing the 
warnings and the cost associated with forecast uncertainty. The study demonstrated that the use of 
a probabilistic forecast had the potential to gain higher benefits for any given lead time. It also 
demonstrated that the lead time of the warning information should be a function of the forecast 
uncertainty and the cost-loss ratio of the people receiving and responding to the warning, as longer 
lead times do not necessarily lead to a larger reduction in flood risk.  
 These previous studies have provided information on how the effectiveness of using flood 
warning information is affected by the accuracy of the prediction and the warning lead time, and/or 
have provided models of human decision-making processes and their effects on evacuation 
processes. Nevertheless, none of the previous studies has integrated the heterogeneity in people’s 
behaviors with the effectiveness of flood warning information. Moreover, these studies have relied 





systems. There is still a need for a framework that bridges the gap between these elements, where 
the empirical data gathered in previous studies would inform human decision-making rules and 
their interactions, while at the same time consider uncertainties in the flood warning information. 
The central premise of this study is to explore how interpretation and response to flood warnings 
affect the benefits of the information provided by the flood warning systems. In other words, the 
study aims to understand the marginal benefit of providing a more accurate forecast and/or longer 
lead times given the heterogeneity in risk aversion aptitudes and their socio-economic 
environments.  
2.3 Methodology 
Responses to flood warnings are very diverse as they are often influenced by many socio-
economic aspects (e.g., social class, age, gender, past experience with floods, flood insurance, 
etc.,) and by the values and beliefs of family and neighbors [Parker et al., 2009a]. The interactions 
among people with such diverse behaviors will eventually form a complex and dynamic system 
(human community) in which all its sub-system components (individuals) are interconnected with 
and affected by each other [Liu et al., 2007b; An, 2012]. This property of the complex system 
imposes challenges to the use of traditional, top-down, centralized simulation approaches (e.g., 
optimization). Agent-based modeling has often been suggested as an appropriate solution to this 
kind of problem for capturing the dynamic feedback of  sub-system components and their inherent 
complexities [Heath et al., 2009]. Unlike top-down approaches, which assume centralized control 
of decision-making processes, agent-based modeling takes a bottom-up approach in which each 
system component is simulated as an autonomous, interdependent, and adaptive agent with 





However, simulating such complex systematic interactions can be quite computationally 
expensive, which has constrained the application of agent-based models in simulating complex 
systems. With more advanced high-performance computing technologies developed in recent 
years, agent-based modeling has been more widely applied to simulating human behaviors in many 
areas, such as river basin management [Cai et al., 2011a; Hu et al., 2015], land use and land cover 
change [Kelley and Evans, 2011; Ralha et al., 2013], agriculture and ecosystems [Ng et al., 2011], 
economic and financial markets [Raberto et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 2013], and  simulation of flood 
and other natural disaster events [Shi et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; Aschwanden et al., 2012]. 
These studies have shown that an agent-based modeling approach can potentially better represent 
empirical systems and improve understanding of the relationships among different system 
components. Therefore, this study adopts an agent-based modeling approach to simulate flood 
warning-response systems. The model simulates (1) a geographical system that consists of a group 
of residents (defined as agents) and a transportation network, (2) probabilistic flood warnings that 
indicate the probability of flood within a specified lead time (e.g., 80% chance of having a flood 
within 5 hours), and (3) decision-making processes that describe how the agents make evacuation 
decisions after receiving the flood warnings and how they evacuate to the safe area through the 
transportation network following certain evacuation rules (Figure 2.1a). The architecture of the 
proposed agent-based model is shown in Figure 2.1b. The upper level of the model describes the 
geographical environment and flood warning information that all of the agents receive. The lower 






Figure 2.1 Illustration of (a) the main components of the flood warning-response system and (b) 
the architecture of the agent-based model. The four figures in Figure 2.1a are: (1) flood warning 
managers issue a flood warning to residents, (2) residents receive the flood warning and make 
evacuation decisions (stay or evacuate), (3) residents evacuate through the transportation network, 
and (4) agents’ final evacuation status, respectively. Figure 2.1b illustrates the structure of the 
model. The upper level of the structure represents agents’ environment (i.e., geographical system 
and flood warning information). The lower level represents the attributes and behaviors that are 
used to define agents.  
Responses to flood warnings result from integration of a set of decision-making processes 
that includes reception of flood warning information, social psychological processes for 
understanding this information, and actions to reduce flood damage (e.g., moving valuables to 
flood-free places, evacuating to safe areas) [Mileti, 1995]. Transportation networks are important 





during emergencies [Chen and Zhan, 2008]. Thus, the proposed agent-based model takes both 
human components (people and their decision-making processes after receiving flood warnings) 
and evacuation transportation networks into consideration.  
2.3.1 Transportation Network and Traffic Rules 
 The transportation system plays a pivotal role in evacuation planning and management and 
is framed in the National Response Framework as a critical infrastructure during natural disasters 
and other emergencies [Department of Homaland Security, 2013; Murray-Tuite and Wolshon, 
2013]. The transportation system is an integrated system including transportation networks, 
vehicles in the networks, and traffic rules that regulate the movements and interactions of the 
vehicles. Thus, modeling a transportation system includes simulating two components: (1) the 
transportation network itself and (2) the traffic rules of the transportation network that all vehicles 
should follow. Regarding the first component, the complexities associated with transportation 
networks make it challenging to include all of their features in simulation model. In order to 
manage this complexity, many studies have suggested the use of simplified representations of 
transportation networks, such as a directed graph [Sheffi et al., 1982; Cova and Johnson, 2003], 
which contains a set of nodes, edges and weights associated with edges.  
Edges and nodes in a directed graph represent a transportation networks’ routes and route 
intersections. The weight of an edge represents the cost of using the route it represents (e.g., 
distance of the route, speed limit, route capacity, etc.). Mathematically, a graph can be represented 
as a matrix. For example, the row and column of a matrix element can represent the starting and 
ending nodes of an edge, respectively, while the value of the element represents the cost (i.e., 
length) of the edge. Edges associated with nodes that are not directly connected are assigned an 





example representation of a transportation network as a graph. The transportation network in 
Figure 2.2a consists of 4 nodes (node 1, 2, 3 and 4); the directed edges among these nodes represent 
connections among them. The matrix in Figure 2.2b is the mathematical representation of the 
directed graph. Note that no direct edge connects node 3 to node 4; in the matrix, the length from 
3 to 4 is therefore set to be infinite. 
         Traffic rules, as mentioned above, are also important components in transportation system 
simulation. Traffic rules regulate the movements and interactions of each individual vehicle in the 
network. Among a variety of traffic simulation methods developed in recent decades, individual-
oriented methods have been suggested as powerful simulation tools for representing individual 
interactions and systematic traffic flow pattern in a transportation system [Chen and Zhan, 2008]. 
The Nagel-Schereckenberg model (N-S model), first proposed in 1992 by Nagel and 
Schreckenberg [1992], is a widely-used, individual-oriented method in both theoretical and 
empirical studies. The N-S model divides a road into cells and categorizes a vehicle’s actions on 
the road into four groups in a time unit: acceleration, deceleration, randomization, and movement.  
         Because the N-S model can capture empirical traffic phenomena and allow for parallel 
computing, it has been widely applied in many studies and has been developed as the 
Transportation Analysis and Simulation System (TRANSIMS) for regional transportation system 
analysis [Smith et al., 1995]. In our study, we use the N-S model to simulate evacuation processes 
on transportation networks, assuming that they will follow the rules defined in the N-S model. We 
assume that individuals follow the all-way stop rule when multiple vehicles arrive at a road 







Figure 2.2 Illustration of (a) a transportation network represented by a directed graph and (b) 
matrix representation of the network. In Figure 2.2(a), numbers inside nodes denote node numbers. 
Arrows of edges denote connections between nodes. Single arrow denotes one-way edge (e.g., 
agents can only move from node 4 to node 3, not in the other direction).  
2.3.2 Household Agents 
         In the face of flood risk, we assume that all family members in a household will affect each 
other in arriving at final evacuation decisions. Both empirical and theoretical flood warning studies 
are typically conducted at the household level . Household demographics (e.g., location, education, 
income, etc.) are therefore assumed to provide sufficient information regarding socio-economic 
aspects of each agent. Therefore, each household is simulated as an agent in this study. An agent 
is defined by the attributes and decision rules that relate it to flood warning responses and actions 
(Figure 2.1b). We assume that all agents share a transportation network for evacuation during 
emergencies and will receive a flood warning at the same time. The agents will need to make 





decision-making processes depend on each agent's attributes and decision rules. The following 
sections introduce how we define the agent's attributes and decision rules in this study. 
         Agent attributes are defined as a set of parameters that describe the characteristics of an 
agent. In this particular study, in which each household is defined as an agent, agent attributes refer 
to the characteristics of each household that relate to flood warning responses and evacuation 
processes. Previous studies have shown that flood warning responses and evacuation processes are 
affected by many physical, psychological and socioeconomic factors [Drabek, 1999; Gladwin et 
al., 2009]. However, representing all of these factors in a model is challenging when lacking 
empirical data. Therefore, in this study, we simplify the representation of these factors and classify 
an agent’s attributes as physical attributes that are related to its evacuation process, and 
psychological attributes that are related to its response to flood warnings (Table 2.1). 
Physical attributes describe an agent’s physical characteristics related to flood warning 
responses and evacuation actions (e.g., location of a house, house type, construction material of 
the house, etc.). To capture the attributes that are essential for simulating the agents’ evacuation 
processes and evaluating the benefits of flood warnings, three types of physical attributes are 
included: agent's geographical location (G), maximum evacuation speed (
maxV ) in the 
transportation network, and evacuation status (ES) at the end of the simulation period. An agent’s 
geographical location in the transportation network is represented by three variables (i.e, 
, ,s eN N d ) that indicate the agent’s movement from starting node ( sN ) to ending node ( eN ) and 
the distance between its current location and ( )sN d . For example, the geographical location of 
agent i in Figure 2.2a can be denoted by [1,3, ]id . An agent’s maximum evacuation speed defines 
its maximum moving speed on a route in a transportation network, which is assumed to be the 





agent's evacuation status at the end of the simulation period. ES is a categorical variable for which 
there are only three values: 1 (denotes that an agent stays at its initial location without considering 
evacuation), 2 (denotes that the agent is currently evacuating but has not arrived at the safe area, 
and 3 (denotes that the agent has arrived at the safe area).  
Table 2.1 List of agents’ attributes 
Factors Variables Description of the variable [unit] 
Physical 
i Agent’s unique identification number [-]1  
ES Agent's evacuation status at the end of simulation [-] 
G Agent’s geographical location in neighborhood [-] 
Vmax Maximum evacuation speed in transportation network [L/T] 
Psychological RT Risk threshold to flood risk [-] 
1 [-] denotes dimensionless parameter.  
 
Psychological attributes measure an agent's risk tolerance to flood risk in flood warning 
systems. Many studies have shown that responses to flood warnings are affected by socio-
psychological factors such as understanding of flood warnings, interpretation of risk, rationality in 
decision-making, past experiences with floods [Weinstein and Klein, 1995; Brewer et al., 2004]. 
When a flood warning is issued, an agent will consider all of these factors in making evacuation 
decisions. Lacking empirical data to represent the complex interconnected relationships among 
these factors, in this study we summarize all of these factors into a single parameter, risk tolerance 
threshold (RT), to measure an agent's maximum tolerance level for flood risk, where flood risk is 
represented by the probability of floods in the neighborhood. The agent will decide to evacuate to 
a safe area if the flood risk exceeds his or her tolerance threshold. We introduce quantification of 
RT in the case study section of this paper. 
Naturally, the agents will behave differently in addressing these flood risks. Risk-tolerant 





proposed for representing the heterogeneity of an agent's decision. The first method is to classify 
agents into several categories (e.g., Li and Liu [2007] divided household agents in a city into six 
groups based on the agents’ income and household size; Ng et al. [2011] divided farmer agents 
into bold and cautious groups based on the agents’ adaptation of biofuel crops. The second method 
is to continuously vary agent’s behavioral parameters (e.g., Benenson [1999] continuously varied 
agents’ income to study residential distribution in a community; Huang et al. [2013] varied agent’s 
purchasing budgets and preference for location parameters to study the spatial patterns of urban 
land markets). This study applies the second method, continuously varying agents’ behavioral 
parameters, with the aim of evaluating how these decision parameters affect model output across 
a broad range of parameter settings. 
 Understanding flood warning information and making evacuation decisions are very 
complex processes [Mileti, 1995]. Simplified decision-making processes have been applied by 
many studies to simulate evacuation behaviors during natural disasters [Shi et al., 2009]. In our 
work, an agent’s response to flood warnings is simplified into three steps: (1) decide if evacuation 
action should be taken based on the flood risk, (2) choose an evacuation path if the agent decides 
to evacuate, and (3) evacuate through the selected path following traffic rules.  
Based on these three decision-making processes, three types of behaviors are simulated in 
this work: evacuation decision, evacuation path search, and real-time evacuation speed (Figure 
2.1). Evacuation decision describes the process of an agent receiving flood warnings and deciding 
if the agent wants to evacuate to a safe area or not. An agent's evacuation decision depends on the 
probability of flooding and the agent's risk tolerance threshold. An agent will decide to evacuate 
if the probability of flooding exceeds its risk tolerance threshold. Otherwise, agents will choose 





agent selects its evacuation path to the safe area. In this study, it is assumed that all of the agents 
have good knowledge about the transportation network and they will choose the shortest path from 
their current locations to the safe area as their evacuation path.  
Besides evacuation route selection, the third important behavior is deciding on the 
evacuation speed at each time step. As an agent evacuates on a route, its speed is contained by (1) 
its own maximum evacuation speed, (2) maximum speed limits on the route, and (3) the location 
and evacuation speed of other agents on the same route. In this study, the agents’ real-time 
evacuation speed is regulated by the N-S traffic model; for more details of how the moving speed 
of an agent is determined, see [Nagel and Schreckenberg, 1992].  
2.3.3 Model Implementation 
         We implement the agent-based model using an object-oriented programming language, 
Java. The model execution process can be summarized in three steps (Figure 2.3): (1) prepare input 
data to construct agents, (2) execute agent-based model, and (3) analyze and output model 
execution results. The following sections introduce more details on the implementation of each of 
these steps.  
             Step 1. Prepare Input Data to Construct Agents. 
Two types of input data are needed to initialize the model: input data for agents and input 
data for evacuation transportation network. Input data for agents define each individual agent's 
attributes and behavior parameters, which are listed in Table 2.1. One of this study’s main 
objectives is to understand how the agent's risk threshold will affect the benefits of flood warnings. 
Without empirical knowledge about the distribution of human behavior parameters, it is often 
assumed that people’s behavioral parameters (i.e., risk threshold in this study) follow probability 





modeling agents' behavior through parameter distributions. Because the coefficient of variation is 
a standard measurement of the dispersion of a distribution, this study applies the normal 
distribution to generate agents’ risk threshold. The mean value of the normal distribution measures 
the agents’ overall risk threshold for floods (
RT ), while the coefficient of variation ( RTCV ) 
measures agents’ behavioral heterogeneity. Coefficient of variation is set to be zero to simulate 
agents with homogeneous risk threshold. 
Input data for the evacuation transportation network defines the number of nodes and how 
the nodes connect with one another in the network. One of these nodes is set as the evacuation 
destination to represent the safe area without flood risk. To improve computational speed, the 
shortest path from any given location to this evacuation destination is calculated before model 
execution and is stored in a Java hashtable with keys and values. The hashtable key is the location 
of an agent in the transportation network. The hashtable value is the shortest path from any given 
location to the evacuation destination. The hashfunction of the hashtable will return the shortest 
evacuation path from the agent's current location to the evacuation destination. 
             Step 2. Execute Model. 
         The model execution process starts with a probabilistic flood warning that indicates the 
probability of flooding within a specified lead time. All of the agents will receive this flood 
warning and make evacuation decisions based on the decision rules described in the previous 
sections. For the agents who decide to evacuate through the transportation network, their 
evacuation processes are simulated by the N-S traffic model at discrete time steps within the flood 
warning lead time. 





         At the end of the model execution process, the model will return the evacuation status of 
each agent. The benefits of flood warnings can be measured by multiple criteria such as total flood 
damage reduction or saving of human life. In this study, we measure the benefits of flood warning 
by the percentage of agents that have evacuated to the safe area at the end of the model simulation.  
 
Figure 2.3 Flowchart of the agent-based model. The items along the left hand are the three model 
execution steps. In the final step, the benefits of flood warnings are measured by the percentage of 
agents that have evacuated to safe area.  
2.3.4 Model Validation  
 Model validation is an essential step in the model development process. The main objective 
of model validation is to demonstrate that the model simulation results can reasonably represent 
or approximate the behaviors observed in the real systems [Heath et al., 2009]. A variety of model 
validation methods and techniques have been proposed for agent-based models [Ngo and See, 





common methods. The objective of structural validation is to demonstrate that the agent-based 
models can correctly represent the behaviors and the operation rules of the real systems. Outcome 
validation compares the model output with observations from real systems when empirical data 
are available.  
 When empirical data are not available to show the interactions among the autonomous 
agents in the system, model validation becomes challenging. To address this challenge, many 
studies have used expert’s knowledge for a qualitative assessment of the model performance 
[Heath et al., 2009]. In this theoretical study, with no empirical data about the model outputs, the 
model validation is conducted from a qualitative perspective with empirical findings from previous 
studies [Mileti, 1995; Parker et al., 2007a; Paul, 2012]. The output validation was done by 
comparing the model output with the expert’s knowledge about flood warning-response systems. 
The next section gives more details about the model validation.  
2.4 Case Study  
2.4.1 Transportation Network  
         A hypothetical geographical system is designed as the case study. The geographical system 
consists of a transportation network and a number of household agents (Figure 2.4). To consider 
flood warning-response systems with different spatiotemporal scales, we use general units to 
measure length and time, following the approach adopted by Zhang et al. [2009]. The length and 
time units are represented by L and T, respectively. The evacuation transportation network has 16 
nodes, with one node selected as the evacuation destination, and 16 routes. Each evacuation route 
is assumed to be a two-way road with one lane for each traveling direction [Chen and Zhan, 2008]. 
The total length of the transportation network is 2210 L. We assume that all lanes in this network 





sign to regulate traffic, which means that an agent arriving at the intersection first will take 
precedence over agents arriving later. More complex transportation networks could be used to 
generate more complex evacuation phenomena, which are discussed further in the conclusion 
section.  
 
Figure 2.4 The transportation network and household agents for the hypothetical case study area. 
(Numbers along routes denote the length of routes. The number of agents in the network ranges 






The household agents are uniformly distributed along the transportation routes. The 
residential density of the neighborhood (RD) is defined as the total number of agents in the 
transportation system divided by the number of nodes in the network. In this study, the total 
number of agents in the transportation network ranges from 320 to 640 (i.e., RD ranges from 20 
agents/node to 40 agents/node) to explore how residential density affect agents’ evacuation 
processes.  
2.4.2 Scenario Design 
        With the aforementioned transportation network as a case study area, this study aims to 
investigate how human’s heterogeneous behaviors (i.e., risk tolerance threshold) and residential 
density could affect the benefits of flood warnings. We design three scenarios. The first scenario 
is for model validation, which we conduct by comparing the results of a set of experiments with 
empirical knowledge about flood warning systems. The second scenario explores how agent’s 
heterogeneous behaviors affect the benefits of flood warnings. The third scenario investigates the 
potential interplay between residential density and flood forecast accuracy and its effect on the 
benefits of flood warnings. Table 2.2 shows the parameters of these three scenarios. 
This study focuses on simulating agents’ evacuation processes during flood events, without 
considerations of false alarms (i.e., the agents receive flood warnings, but eventually there is no 
flood). Therefore, we consider flood forecast accuracy only in terms of the predicted flood 
probability. For example, for a flood forecast indicating 85% probability of having a flood in 3 
hours, the associated forecast accuracy and lead time will be 0.85 and 3 hours, respectively. We 
also assume that the agents will receive a flood warning at the beginning of model execution, and 





other words, the agents only receive one piece of flood warning information during the entire 
simulation.  
Table 2.2 Parameters for the three simulated scenarios in the case study area 
Parameter [unit] Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Mean value of agents’ risk threshold [-]1 0.75 0.6:0.05:0.92 0.75 
Coefficient of variation of risk threshold [-] 0.1 0:0.05:0.3 0.1 
Predicted flood probability [-] 0.6:0.05:0.9 0.75 0.6:0.05:0.9 
Flood forecast lead time [T] 100:100:700 200:200:600 400 
Residential density [number of agents/node] 30 30 20:10:40 
1 [-] denotes dimensionless parameter. 
2 X:d:Y denotes a numeric vector from X to Y with increment of d. For example, vector [1, 
3, 5, 7] can be represented by 1:2:7. 
2.5 Results and Discussion  
2.5.1 Model Validation  
        In this section, we test whether our model can capture the following findings of previous 
empirical studies: (1) that the benefits of flood warnings have a positive relationship with flood 
forecast  accuracy and (2) that the benefits of flood warnings have a positive relationship with 
flood warning lead time [Estrela et al., 2001; National Hydrologic Warning Council, 2002; 
Golnaraghi et al., 2008]. The results of model validation are shown in Figures 2.5a-c.  
 Figure 2.5a shows that the benefits of flood warnings increase as flood warning lead time 
increases. Figure 2.5b shows that the benefits of flood warnings increase as predicted flood 
probability increases. Figure 2.5c further suggests that the benefits of flood warnings are 
constrained by both predicted flood probability and flood warning lead time. The benefits of flood 
warnings are always low if predicted flood probability or lead time reaches its lower limit (0.7 for 





for flood warnings, upper limits also exist beyond which the benefits of flood warnings will not 
increase significantly (0.75 for predicted flood probability and 500 T for flood warning lead time 
in the case study).  The results from Figure 2.5a-c demonstrate that the model is able to capture 
the empirical findings from experts’ domain knowledge of flood warning information.  
 
Figure 2.5 (a) The relationship between the benefits of flood warnings and flood warning lead time 
when predicted flood probability is 80%; (b) The relationship between the benefits of flood 





Figure 2.5 (cont.) plot of the benefits of flood warnings associated with predicted flood probability 
(Y-axis) and flood warning lead time (X-axis)  
2.5.2 Impacts of Behavioral Heterogeneity on Modeling Results 
         This scenario aims to explore the relationships between the benefits of flood warnings and 
agents’ flood warning response behaviors. To be specific, this scenario addresses two questions: 
(1) Will agents’ flood-warning response behaviors (i.e., agents’ risk-tolerance threshold) affect the 
benefits of flood warnings? (2) How will agents’ behavioral heterogeneity (i.e., variation of agents’ 
risk-tolerance threshold) affect the benefits of flood warnings? The first question aims to 
demonstrate that the benefits of flood warnings can be affected by agents’ behaviors; the second 
question is intended to evaluate the importance of considering the characteristic of behavioral 
heterogeneity in simulating agents’ behaviors. 
         Agents' behavioral heterogeneity implies that different agents will behave differently under 
identical environment conditions (i.e., flood warnings). In this study, we measure behavioral 
heterogeneity by the coefficient of variation of the agents' risk threshold. Four groups of agents 
are investigated: two groups of risk-tolerant agents with average risk threshold higher than 
predicted flood risk, and two groups of risk-averse agents with average risk threshold lower than 
the predicted flood risk. We set seven levels of behavioral heterogeneity, with coefficient of 
variation of risk threshold varying from 0 to 0.3. Agents are homogeneous when the coefficient of 
variation is 0.  
Figure 2.6 shows the simulation results for a scenario in which the predicted flood 
probability ( fp ) is 0.75 and flood warning lead time is 400 T. The results show that the benefits 
of flood warnings increase as agent heterogeneity increases for risk-tolerant agents ( RT fp  ). 





tolerance (RT) follows normal distribution with mean value (
RT ) and coefficient of variation
RTCV , ( ~ ( , CV ) | RT [0,1])RT RT RTRT N    , the percentage of residents ( ep ) who decide to 














where fp  is the predicted flood probability of  the issued flood warnings, RTp  is the probability 
distribution function of RT, and ( )   is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
distribution. For risk-tolerant agents ( RT fp  ), ep increases as RTCV increases, indicating that 
more agents decide to evacuate as behavioral heterogeneity indicator 
RTCV  increases. Therefore, 
the benefits of flood warnings increase as agent behavioral heterogeneity increases. The opposite 
holds true for risk-averse agents. This finding agrees with previous studies that the relationship 
between agent heterogeneity and model output is not uniformly monotonic [Huang et al., 2013]. 
This finding suggests that, when providing the public with flood warning information, flood-
warning managers should not expect that all of the public interpret and respond to the information 
in the same way. Instead, special information and consideration should be given for certain groups 
of people. For example, people who have no experience with floods are less likely to respond to 
flood warnings compared with people who have past experience. This experience includes not only 
experiences of evacuation during actual flood events with different flood warning systems, but 
also experiences in practicing evacuation as part of emergency preparedness. It has been shown 
that practicing evacuation drills is effective to enhance the awareness of flood risk and mitigate 
flood damages [Yamada et al., 2011]. Social class, gender, and level of education might also affect 
people's understanding of flood warnings and evacuation actions [Parker et al., 2007a]. These 





consideration when issuing flood warnings. For example, the model results suggest that risk-
tolerant agents will not take actions to evacuate unless they are provided with warnings of high 
flood probability. Thus, it is important for flood warning managers to identify risk-tolerant agents 
in the community and provide additional information or resources to aid their decision-making. 
 
Figure 2.6 The relationship between the benefits of flood warnings and agent’s behavioral 
heterogeneity when predicted flood probability ( fp ) is 75% and flood warning lead time is 400 T. 
Results for risk-tolerant agents ( RT fp  ) are shown by dotted lines. Results for risk-averse agents 
( RT fp  ) are shown by solid lines. 
Besides risk threshold heterogeneity, agents’ average risk threshold is also an important 
factor affecting the benefits of flood warnings. To understand the relationship between flood 
warning benefits and agents' average risk threshold levels, we investigate three different flood 





results provide at least two insights. First, as expected, modeled flood warnings with longer lead 
times outperform those with relatively shorter lead times, since longer lead times allow the agents 
more time to respond to flood warnings and evacuate to safe areas. However, the results also show 
that the marginal benefit from the improvement in lead time depends, to a great extent, on the 
agents' risk threshold. More benefits could be achieved by increasing warning lead times for risk-
averse agents than for risk-tolerant agents. However, even a longer warning lead time yields no 
additional benefits if the agents' risk threshold exceeds a limit (0.85 in this case). This suggests 
that risk-tolerant agents will not benefit from flood warnings with longer lead times if their risk 
thresholds do not change. This finding leads to the second insight of the results: in addition to 
providing the public with better flood warning information, informing them about how to respond 
to flood warnings could be an effective way to reduce flood-related damage. For example, the 
model results here show that there are almost no additional benefits if the flood warning lead time 
is increased from 200 T to 400 T when the agents' average risk threshold is 0.80. However, a 
benefit increase of 0.22 is achieved if the agents become more risk averse, with the risk threshold 
reduced from 0.8 to 0.75 (from A to B in Figure 2.7). Empirical studies have shown that people's 
understanding of flood risk is often not necessarily logical, leading to misjudgment of flood risk 
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Weinstein and Klein, 1995]; educating them how to respond 
appropriately could be beneficial. Thus, combining appropriate flood warning response with 






Figure 2.7 The relationship between the benefits of flood warnings and agents’ average risk 
threshold under three flood-warning scenarios in which predicted flood probability is 75% and 
lead times are 200 T, 400 T, and 600 T, respectively. 
2.5.3 Impacts of Residential Density on Modeling Results 
 This scenario aims to understand how the attributes of residential properties affect agent’s 
evacuation process and ultimately affect the benefits of flood warnings. The attributes of 
residential properties can be measured by multiple matrices, such as distribution, density, 
educational level and social class of residents, etc. In this particular study, we only focus on 
residential density (RD), which may significantly affect traffic load during an emergency 
evacuation process. 
Figure 2.8 explores the impacts of residential density on the benefits of flood warnings 
under different flood warning scenarios. In general, flood warnings with higher predicted flood 
probability are associated with greater benefits, especially in low-density residential areas. 





residential areas because a large fraction of the agents that take evacuation actions may not 
successfully evacuate to a safe area as a result of traffic congestion caused by high traffic loads. In 
other words, the marginal benefit of providing higher predicted flood probability is higher in low 
residential areas than in high residential areas. Therefore, the model results show that it is more 
effective to increase predicted flood probability in low residential areas. In contrast, in high 
residential areas, increase in predicted flood probability does not yield a significant increase in the 
benefits of flood warnings. Instead of working on increasing predicted flood probability, 
increasing flood warning lead time or improving evacuation routes may be more beneficial.  
 
Figure 2.8 Contour plot of the benefits of flood warnings, residential density, and predicted flood 







Figure 2.9 summarizes agents’ evacuation status and evacuation times under different 
residential densities. As residential density increases, the number of agents that decide to evacuate 
through the transportation network increases. This results in two phenomena as shown in Figure 
2.9. First, the percentage of agents that successfully evacuate to the safe area decreases as 
residential density increases. For example, 100% of the agents that decide to evacuate can 
successfully evacuate to the safe area when the residential density is 20 agents/node. However, 
this value decreases to 81% and 68% when the residential density is 30 agents/node and 40 
agents/node, respectively (Figure 2.9a). Second, the average evacuation time for all of the agents 
increases as residential density increases, which is 150.2 T, 162.3 T and 169.6 T when residential 
density is 20 agents/node, 30 agents/node, and 40 agents/node, respectively (Figure 2.9 b-d). The 
model results suggest that residential density is an important factor that affects the agents’ 
evacuation process in the transportation network. Flood warning managers need to pre-estimate 
the total time needed for the people to evacuate to the safe area when issuing flood warnings, 







Figure 2.9 Agents’ evacuation statistics when predicted flood probability is 80% with flood 
warning lead time of 400 T. (a) Summary of the agents’ evacuation status when residential density 
is 20 agents/node (scenario b), 30 agents/node (scenario c), and 40 agents/node (scenario d), 
respectively; (b-d) Distribution of agents’ evacuation time (i.e., the time that an agent takes to 
evacuate to safe area) for scenario b, c, and d. 
 To further investigate how residential density affects agents’ evacuation processes, we 
simulate the evacuation process when residential density is 20 agents/node, 30 agents/node, and 
40 agents/node, respectively. The simulation results are shown in Figure 2.10. The time needed 
for 50% (100%) of the agents to evacuate to the safe area is approximately 200 T (580 T) when 
residential density is 30 agents/node. This time is approximately 150 T (430 T) and 250 T  (785 
T) when the residential density is 20 agents/node and 40 agents/node, respectively. The results 





residential density increases. For example, when residential density increases by 33% (from 30 
agents/node to 40 agents/node), the time needed for 50% of the agents to evacuate to the safe area 
increases by 25% (from 200 T to 250 T). However, the time for 100% of the agents to evacuate to 
the safe area increases by 35% (from 580 T to 785 T). Similar conclusion can be drawn when 
residential density increases from 20 agents/node to 30 agents/node. This implies that achieving 
high benefits from flood warnings is much more challenging in high residential areas than in low 
residential areas, because the increase in evacuation time is larger than the increase in agent 
population.  
 It is also noticed that, for all three cases of residential density, evacuation rates increase 
slower after a certain time when more agents are evacuating through the transportation network. 
This is caused by traffic jams when the number of agents that are evacuating through the 
transportation network exceeds transportation capacity. Furthermore, evacuation rates increase 
faster in cases with lower residential density than those with higher residential density. We expect 
that residential density will have less impact on evacuation rates if the transportation network’s 






Figure 2.10 Simulation of agents’ evacuation processes when residential density is 20 agents/node 
(dashed line), 30 agents/node (solid line), and 40 agents/node (dotted line), respectively.  
2.6 Conclusions 
This study proposes an agent-based modeling framework for incorporating the quality of 
flood warnings (i.e., predicted flood probability and lead time), the heterogeneous nature of 
response to flood warnings (i.e., the mean and coefficient of variation of agents’ risk threshold), 
and residential density in flood warning-response systems. The framework is coupled with a traffic 
model to evaluate how these components interplay with each other to affect agents’ evacuation 
processes in the face of flood warnings. There are three important findings from this study: (1) the 
benefits of flood warnings are affected not only by the quality of flood warning information, but 
also by  responses to such information; (2) the marginal benefit associated with providing better 
flood warnings is significantly constrained if people behave in a more risk-tolerant manner; and 





benefits of flood warnings. This highlights the need for different flood warnings depending on the 
specific residential density of flood zones.  
 While tremendous efforts have focused on providing better flood warning information to 
the public, this study suggests that collecting and using information on human behaviors and 
residential characteristics of flood-threatened areas will make flood warnings more beneficial. 
Such information can help flood-warning managers increase warning efficiency by enabling them 
to determine when and how to release flood warnings to the public. With advanced information 
delivery technologies such as social media, it is not beyond the realm of reality that all of this 
information could be available and accessible in real-time. Twitter, Facebook, and cell phone 
location services could provide real-time information about flood situations and recommended 
actions in floods. Flood warning managers could also collect and use information from social 
media to update the current flood forecast with increased detail and accuracy.  Such information 
may also assist emergency managers to rescue people during floods. For example, in the 2011 Thai 
flood, Twitter was used by local citizens to collect and disseminate up-to-the-minute flood 
information and requests for assistance. It was quite beneficial for emergency managers to analyze 
and use this Twitter information to provide assistance in a timely manner according to specific 
needs [Kongthon et al., 2012].  
This study is a theoretical modeling framework to investigate the complexities of flood 
warning response and evacuation systems and inevitably has some limitations. First, we simulate 
a single flooding event without considering the public’s behavioral changes resulting from 
experiences of flood events. In reality, people might change their flood risk tolerance based on 
their experiences. For example, after experiencing several flooding events and high flood-related 





socioeconomic and demographic data and their responses to flood warnings to understand the 
decision-making processes during flood events. Second, in this paper, we assume that all of the 
agents remaining in the area at the end of model execution will be flooded, and the agents that 
have evacuated to the safe area before the end of model execution will not be flooded. Thus, we 
did not specify the direction, speed, or timing of the flood inundation processes. In future work, 
we will simulate the gradual inundation processes to better model flood behaviors in the real world. 
Third, some assumptions of the theoretical model may not apply to real-world situations. For 
example, we assume that all of the households are knowledgeable about evacuation paths and will 
choose the shortest one. However, in reality the agents might dynamically change evacuation paths 
based on real-time traffic conditions and warning information. Further exploration of the impact 
of individual’s route choice behaviors on transportation conditions during evacuations has been 
previously suggested [Pel et al., 2011] and our study concurs with this need. Finally, this study 
assumes that agents make independent evacuation decisions without communicating with each 
other. In the real world,  relatives, neighbors, and friends greatly affect evacuation decisions 
[Parker et al., 2009a, 2009b]. In general, interactions among agents affect not only individual 
behaviors but also the emergence of the overall system. Future work may explore how an agent’s 
decisions are related to the agent’s geographical location in the residential area (e.g., agents that 
are more close to safe areas may be more likely to behave in a risk-tolerant manner). Other 
socioeconomic household characteristics (e.g., size of household, economic value of the home, pet 
ownership) might also affect agents’ behaviors. This study can be expanded by incorporating 
additional socio-economic heterogeneities into the model. These improvements can better capture 
the complex behaviors of flood warning-response systems and help emergency managers with 





Chapter III. Impacts of Social Interactions: Do Social Media Make Us More Resilient or 
Vulnerable to Flood Risk?  
Based on the modeling framework presented in Chapter II, this chapter focuses on 
evaluating how social interactions affect agents’ flood risk awareness and evacuation behaviors. 
Section 3.1 overviews previous studies on social interaction through social media and introduces 
the objective of this study. Section 3.2 presents the methodology, focusing on individuals’ opinion 
dynamics when exposed to multiple information sources and the traffic model that simulates 
individuals’ evacuation process in transportation network. Section 3.3 presents the case study and 
modeling results, followed by conclusions in section 3.4.  
3.1 Introduction  
With the rapid development of computer-mediated technologies and more universal 
internet accessibility, social media, such as Twitter, Facebook and other information sharing 
platforms, have become important tools for individuals to obtain and share information with each 
other [Asur and Huberman, 2010; Kwak et al., 2010; Gil de Zúñiga and Diehl, 2017]. Unlike 
conventional media such as radio and television that are typically developed for one-to-many 
information dissemination, social media allow both one-to-many and many-to-many information 
dissemination and message exchange [Bassett et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2015]. Individuals can 
easily share their daily activities, news, opinions, ideas, etc., with their neighbors, families and 
friends, interest groups, and the public through social networks that transcend territorial 
boundaries, which makes communication between individuals faster and more efficient [Zhu, 
2017]. Due to the many advantages in information dissemination and social networking, social 





elections [Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012], protests such as Arab Spring [Hussain and Howard, 2013]), 
economic behaviors such as business and marketing [Asur and Huberman, 2010; Marshall et al., 
2012], and coordination and management during natural disasters [Palen et al., 2010; Kongthon et 
al., 2012; Alexander, 2014; Houston et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2015]. This study focuses on the 
role of social media in evacuation processes during flood events.  
Floods are common natural disasters in the U.S. and many other countries and have caused 
significant economic damage and loss of life [Heaney et al., 2000; Smith and Matthews, 2015]. 
Flood warning systems have been recognized as efficient tools for flood damage mitigation and 
crisis management [Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009; Parker et al., 2009a; Pappenberger et al., 
2015; Parker, 2017]. However, studies have shown that the benefits of flood warnings can be 
significantly affected by (1) the delivery of flood warnings that determines if communities in flood 
zones can receive accurate and timely flood warnings, and (2) some socioeconomic factors (e.g., 
education and income of the members in household, economic value of the home) that could affect 
households’ responses and reactions to flood warnings [Parker and Handmer, 1998; 
Kongsomsaksakul et al., 2005; Parker et al., 2007b, 2009a]. Therefore, it is important to evaluate 
the benefits of flood warnings in the context of a coupled social, economic and hydrologic 
framework [Sivapalan et al., 2012; Di Baldassarre et al., 2013, 2014; Girons Lopez et al., 2017], 
with consideration of the heterogeneity in households’ responses to flood warnings.  
In recent years, social media have been used to spread warnings of natural disasters, 
including floods, to increase awareness of the danger and to provide efficient communications 
between affected individuals, emergency managers, and first responders [Palen et al., 2010; 
Kongthon et al., 2012; Alexander, 2014; Houston et al., 2015]. For example, during the 2009 Red 





damage reports, and other flood-related subjects [Palen et al., 2010; Vieweg et al., 2010]. 
Similarly, significant numbers of Twitter messages were generated and shared by citizens in flood 
zones during the 2011 Thai flood. These messages provided up-to-the-minute information about 
location-based flood conditions, available resources, and needed rescues. Emergency responders 
can use the information to create instant flood situation maps and to better coordinate available 
resources for rescues and evacuations [Russell, 2011; Kongthon et al., 2012].   
Despite these advantages, social media could also pose potential threats to crisis 
management when outdated, false, or misleading information is spread through social media 
[Acemoglu et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2012; Alexander, 2014]. This concern is partially the result 
of individuals having limited time to verify the accuracy of information on social media during 
emergencies. For example, during Japan’s Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011, rumors claiming that 
iodized salt can prevent radiation-related illness and that all importing of sea salt would be exposed 
to nuclear pollution after the nuclear meltdown were rapidly and widely spread on China’s social 
media. Many people rushed into supermarkets and grocery stores to buy and hoard salt, which 
resulted in market swarms and unprecedented salt shortage in many regions of China [Brenhouse, 
2011]. In the case of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, altered images and false news were spread and 
shared by many social media users, and were even picked up by mainstream media in New York 
City until they were corrected by field checking [Alexander, 2014]. The impact of such 
misinformation from social media in natural disaster management requires timely attention.  
Motivated by this need, this study examines how social media affects individuals’ flood 
risk awareness and consequent evacuation processes. We consider a residential area with an 
impending flood event, where emergency managers obtain and broadcast flood warnings to the 





with each other through social media (e.g., Twitter or Facebook) to share their opinions about their 
perceived flood risk. A resident will choose to evacuate to a safe area if he thinks that the flood is 
sufficiently likely to occur. 
 Some studies have modeled individuals’ evacuation behaviors as responses to flood 
warnings [Chen and Zhan, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Dawson et al., 2011; Du et al., 2016]. For 
example, Dawson et al. [2011] integrated a hydrodynamic model and a traffic model to estimate 
the number of people exposed to floods under varying storm surge conditions. Furthermore, Du et 
al. [2016] investigated how individuals’ evacuation behaviors are affected by their heterogeneous 
responses to flood warnings, as well as flood prediction accuracy and lead time. The results show 
that residents’ evacuation behaviors can be significantly affected by various individuals’ flood 
risk-tolerance thresholds.  
Studies have also modeled how individuals form their opinions through social interactions. 
Among them, Hegselmann and Krause [2002] proposed various models for simulating 
individuals’ opinion formation within interacting groups. Watts [2002] developed a binary-
decision model in which individuals’ decisions are explicitly dependent on the actions of their 
neighbors. The model was shown to be capable of capturing some important features of global 
cascades in social and economic systems.  Bassett et al. [2012] developed an opinion dynamics 
model to simulate individual’s opinion formation when exposed to multiple information sources 
(e.g., communication on social media and observations of the neighbors’ actions) in natural 
disasters. Similarly, McCullen et al. [2013] developed an innovation diffusion model in which 
households form opinions through pairwise social interactions and choose to adopt innovations 





role of stubborn individuals, who can influence others but do not change their own opinions, in a 
group’s opinion dynamics.  
Although existing studies have shown how individuals’ opinions can be shaped by social 
networking, few studies have taken into account information from multiple sources in a consistent 
framework to analyze the impact of social media on opinion dynamics. Real-world information 
sources includue global broadcast, social media, and observations of other individuals’ actions 
[Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011; Crokidakis and Anteneodo, 2012; Ghaderi and Srikant, 2013; Jia 
et al., 2015], as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Global broadcast is information that emergency managers 
spread to all of the agents in the system [Bassett et al., 2012]. Examples of global broadcast include 
radio and television emergency alerts, as well as some other public notices. Social media (e.g., 
Twitter and Facebook) allow for pairwise information transmission between the agents in a group. 
When two agents interact on social media, they will exchange each other’s opinion on flood risk 
[Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011]. Neighbor observation takes account of how an agent’s opinion 
is affected by the actions of other agents in a group [Watts, 2002]. In this study, we integrate social 
media with global broadcast and neighbor observations into a general quantitative framework with 
consideration of individual heterogeneity in beliefs about different sources of information and 






Figure 3.1 Illustration of three types of information sources related to flood warning dissemination: 
(a) global broadcast that spreads flood warnings from the global source to all of the individuals, 
(b) social media that allow pairwise information exchange (illustrated by blue dashed lines), and 
(c) neighbor observations that consider the influence of each individual’s neighbors (illustrated by 
the red circles).  
Moreover, according to our knowledge, there is still a need to bridge the gap between 
opinion dynamics and evacuation processes that are influenced by individuals’ opinions on flood 
risk, evacuation decisions, and transportation networks. Thus, we propose a modeling tool to 
couple the simulation of opinion dynamics and the evacuation processes. An agent-based model 
(ABM) is developed to simulate opinion dynamics. A traffic model is used to simulate the 
evacuation process. The coupled ABM and traffic model simulates how individuals update their 
awareness of flood risk and how individuals’ opinion dynamics affect their evacuation processes 
in the transportation network. Using the modeling tool, we address the following research 





flood event? (2) Do social media help increase the evacuation rate of a community? (3) How do 
stubborn individuals (i.e., those who do not change their opinions on flood risk) affect the opinion 
dynamics and evacuation processes of the community?  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
methodology, focusing on modeling individuals’ opinion dynamics when exposed to multiple 
information sources and their evacuation processes in a transportation network. Section 3.3 
presents an example of a hypothetical residential area, the modeling results, and discussions. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 3.4.  
3.2 Methodology  
We consider a residential area consisting of households and a transportation network. 
Following the approach of our prior work [Du et al., 2016] (Chapter II of this document), the 
transportation network in this paper is represented by a directed graph consisting of a number of 
links (i.e., roads) and nodes (i.e., road intersections). Each household is represented by an agent 
with a set of attributes and rules that describe the agent’s geographical location, risk-tolerance 
threshold for flooding, priorities to the various information sources, and learning attitudes, etc.  
3.2.1 Modeling Opinion Dynamics 
In this study, an agent’s opinion (denoted by a continuous variable ,  [0,  1]S S ), refers to 
his perception of how likely there will be a flood in the residential area [Lorenz, 2005]. Each agent 
has a flood risk-tolerance threshold (denoted by a continuous variable  , [0,  1]  ) [Schelling, 
1973; Watts, 2002]. At each time step, the agent will make a binary decision (denoted by a binary 





we use a simple decision rule to describe agents’ evacuation decisions: at any time step t, an agent 
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Opinion dynamics refers to the process in which agents form and update their opinions 
over time. Given that agents might not always collect information to update their opinions at each 
time step, we simulate agents’ opinion dynamics as a stochastic process: At each time step, an 
agent will either choose to collect new information and update his opinion or not. Let a binary 
variable ,j t  ( , {0,  1}j t  ) denote whether agent j updates his opinion at time t. When choosing 
not to update his opinion ( , 0j t  ), the agent will keep his opinion of time step t-1 (i.e., , , 1j t j tS S 
). Otherwise, the agent will use new information on flood risk to update his opinion.  
 For agent j at time step t, we use , , ,,  ,  and  
G S N
j t j t j tI I I  to denote the information about flood 
risk obtained from global forecast, social media, and neighbor observations, respectively. Each of 
these information sources is described in turn below.  
Let 
tG denote the value of flood risk broadcast from a global source at time t (i.e., 
[0,  1]tG  , a higher value of tG indicates a higher flood risk). Since global broadcast is a one-to-
many information broadcast process, all of the agents will obtain the same global information at 
each time step (i.e., ,
G
j t tI G ).  
Following previous studies, an agent’s information obtained from social networking is 
modeled as a linear combination of the opinions of all of the agents that are connected to the agent 
[DeGroot, 1974; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Ghaderi and Srikant, 2014]. Denoting ,ij t  as 





information obtained from social networking ( ,
S
j tI ) can be modeled as a weighted average of 
information from all agents with whom agent j communicates, as shown in equation (2):  








  (2) 
We model agents’ social networking as a binary stochastic process: at each time step t, 
agent j either exchanges information with agent i (i.e., agent j reads agent i’s post on social media 
at time t, denoted by , 1ij ta  ) or not (i.e., , 0ij ta  ). Taking account of all of the n agents that could 

















In a social network with n agents, agents with stronger social connections have larger 
probabilities to read each other’s posts. In this study, we assume that agents who are physically 
closer to each other have stronger social connections and thus have larger probabilities to share 
their opinions [Bassett et al., 2012]. Denoting the distance between agents i and j as ijd  and the 
maximum distance between any of the two agents in the system as maxd , we use a simple model to 
represent the relationship between the probability that they exchange information at time t and 
their distance: 
, max( 1) 1 / ( 1)ij t ijp a d d    .  
The assumption of agents’ social interaction (i.e., the likelihood of social interaction 
decreases with proximity) employed in this study is based on intuitive reasoning that individuals 
living closer to each other will have more chance to meet each other to exchange information on 
social media. However, we admit that this assumption does not necessarily hold true in some real-





work can validate or refine this assumption by mapping individuals’ social connections using data 
mining tools when detailed social communication data become available [Sobkowicz et al., 2012; 
Gil de Zúñiga and Diehl, 2017; Zhu, 2017].  
Combining equations (2) and (3), agent j’s information obtained from social media can be 






















In contrast to sharing opinions over social media, neighbor observations are observed 
actions. Many studies have shown that an agent’s opinion is often affected by the actions of other 
agents in the group, due to the fact that individuals might not have sufficient information to make 
decisions, or their ability to process information is limited during emergency situations [Schelling, 
1973; Watts, 2002; Kearns et al., 2009; Centola, 2010]. We use the weighted average of the actions 
of an agent’s neighbors to represent the information obtained from neighbor observations. Agent 
j’s neighbors can be defined by a group of agents that are close to j in their residential area. In this 
study, we define agent j’s neighbors as the set of agents that live on the same road as j (e.g., the 
red circles in Figure 3.1c) based on the assumption that agents who live on the same street can 
directly observe the actions of each other. Let ijb  denote if agents i and j are neighbors ( 1ijb  ) or 
not ( 0ijb  ), agent j’s information obtained from neighbor observations can be represented by 


























So far, we have modeled how agents obtain information from multiple separate sources. 
When all of these information sources are available, agents might have different degrees of trust 
in, and are influenced differently by, these information sources, depending on a variety of factors. 
For example, if global broadcast information has proven to be unreliable in the past, people might 
rely less on global broadcast. Similarly, rumors and misleading information on social media might 
reduce the influence of social media on agents’ opinion formation. McCullen et al. [2013] 
proposed using a set of weighting factors to formulate agents’ opinion dynamics driven by multiple 
information sources. In this study, we follow this approach and introduce three information 
influence parameters, ,  ,  and j j j    to represent the influence of global broadcast, social media, 
and neighbor observation on agent j’s opinion adoption, respectively, and 1j j j     . Thus, 
the information obtained from multiple sources can be represented by equation (6).  
 , , , ,
G S N
j t j j t j j t j j tI I I I      (6) 
When new information on flood risk is obtained, the agent j will update his opinion on 
flood risk. We adopt the Widrow-Hoff learning rule to simulate the agent’s opinion dynamics 
[Sutton, 1988; Widrow and Hoff, 1988; Widrow and Lehr, 1993], as shown in equation (7).  
 , , 1 ,j t j t j j tS S I    (7) 
where ,j tI  is the difference between the flood risk obtained from multiple sources at time t and 
the agent’s original opinion on flood risk at time t-1 ( , , , 1j t j t j tI I S    ). j  is the agent’s learning 
rate, which is a behavioral parameter measuring how much the agent adheres to his past opinion 
when new information is available. This parameter considers that an agent might not completely 





information to keep his past opinion ( 0j  ) [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1999]. The concept of opinion 
adherences is based on observations that individuals’ beliefs typically display some amount of 
inertia [Watts, 2002; Dash and Gladwin, 2007]. Combining equations (6) and (7), agent j’s opinion 
dynamics can be represented by equation (8).  
 , , 1 , , ,(1 ) ( )
G S N
j t j j t j j j t j j t j j tS S I I I          (8) 
The opinion dynamics model (i.e., Equation (8)) presented in this study is a more  general 
form compared with those used in previous models [e.g., Bassett et al., 2012; McCullen et al., 
2013]. For example, by setting ( ,  ,  ,  ) (1,  0,  0,  0.5)j j j j      (i.e., the agent only uses global 
information and  treats prior opinion and new information equally), Equation (8) becomes 
equivalent to the opinion dynamics model driven by global information proposed by Bassett et al. 
[2012]. Similarly, the model is made equivalent to that given by McCullen et al. [2013] by setting 
1j   (i.e., the agent only uses new information to update his opinion).  
In addition, Equation (8) considers differences in people’s behaviors through the agents’ 
behavioral parameters ,  ,  ,  and j j j j    . This takes advantage of the strength of agent-based 
models in representing the heterogeneity in agents’ behaviors [Huang et al., 2013], and relaxes the 
assumption that all agents in a community behave in the same manner (e.g., as handled in the 
opinion dynamics model by Bassett et al. [2012]).  In this hypothetical study without behavioral 
data, we use a coefficient of variation ( vC ) for each of the behavioral parameters ( ,  ,  ,  and    
) to measure the level of agents’ behavioral heterogeneity. Following previous studies [Marino et 
al., 2008; Bertella et al., 2014], we use a normal distribution to sample the behavioral parameters 





In an impending flood event, the predicted flood probability will increase over time before 
the flood. Furthermore, forecasting with better prediction capability will give a higher flood 
probability and/or a longer lead time. Considering these two factors, we use a simple model, for 
illustrative purpose, to represent the predicted flood risk as a function of time t during the flood 
forecast horizon (FH) ( 1, 2, ..., t FH ), shown in Equation (9):  
 
1
( ) ;  ( ) [0,  1]G t t G t
FH
    (9) 
where [ 1,  1]    is a parameter that measures the quality of flood warnings. A larger   is 
associated with flood warnings that can predict higher flood risk in flood events.  Predicted flood 
risk G(t) is closer to 1 (actual flood risk) when   is larger.   
3.2.2 Modeling the Evacuation Process  
Agents that decide to evacuate will move from their current location to the evacuation 
destination in the transportation network. We assume all agents have good knowledge of the 
transportation network and will choose the shortest route to evacuate. We use a categorical 
parameter jK  to represent agent j’s evacuation status. 0jK   denotes that agent j decides not to 
evacuate; jK =1 when agent j decides to evacuate but does not arrive at the destination; jK =2 when 
the agent arrives at the destination, which represents a successful evacuation case.   
In this study, as in the previous chapter, we adopt the Nagel-Schreckenberg traffic model 
(N-S model) to simulate agents’ evacuation behaviors via a transportation network [Nagel and 
Schreckenberg, 1992]. For details of the N-S model, see Chapter 2 and the Appendix of this thesis.  
3.2.3 Model Outputs at the System Level  
We use multiple indicators to measure behaviors at the system level (i.e., a community), 





( 1 2[ ,  ,  ...,  ]t t t TS S S S   , where t kS   is the average opinion over all agents at time step k), (2) 
agents’ decision trajectory X  ( 1 2[ ,  ,  ...,  ]t t t TX X X X   , where t kX   is the average decision over 
all agents at time step k), and (3) agents’ evacuation rate   (i.e., 1 2[ ,  ,  ...,  ]t t t T       , where 
t k  is the percentage of agents that successfully evacuate to the destination at time step k). 
Given the fact that not everyone opens social media channels at all times for social 
interaction, information transmission and social communication are assumed to occur in a 
stochastic manner. The Monte Carlo method (i.e., execution of the model multiple times with 
model inputs that are randomly and repeatedly sampled from the sampling space)  is applied in 
this study to address the stochastic characteristics of the study problem [Decker, 1991]. We 
executed the model 1000 times (the number of simulations that ensures output stabilization for this 
study) to obtain the ensemble opinion trajectory S  , ensemble decision trajectory X  , and 
ensemble evacuation rate  .  
3.3 A Demonstration Example 
 
We apply the model described above in a synthetic residential area, which consists of a 
transportation network and a group of agents (Figure 3.2). Following previous studies, we use L 
and T to represent the units of length and time, respectively [Zhang et al., 2009; Du et al., 2016]. 
In this transportation network, all of the roads are assumed to have length of 100 L, indicating that 
each road can be divided into 100 cells. Among the 16 nodes in the transportation network, the 
one on the bottom right is set as the evacuation destination.  
Agents are uniformly distributed along the roads in the transportation network. Residential 





network, and is set as 10 in this study (i.e., corresponding to 240 agents in the transportation 
network). The sensitivity of residential density is examined in section 3.3.5.  
 
Figure 3.2 Illustration of the synthetic case study area that consists of a transportation network and 
a number of agents. The transportation network is a regular lattice network with 24 roads and 16 
nodes (the node on the bottom right is set as the designated evacuation destination for all of the 
agents). The agents are uniformly distributed along the roads.  
The following sections present the modeling results. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 present 
scenario-based analysis and sensitivity analysis, respectively. Next, sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 





Finally, section 3.3.5 shows how evacuation rates are jointly affected by sources of information, 
transportation capacity, and flood warnings with various forecast capabilities.  
3.3.1. Scenario-Based Analysis  
To assess the impact of model parameters on the results, a scenario-based analysis is 
conducted. We design three scenarios, each of which represents a special combination of 
information sources. The first scenario considers the case in which only global broadcast 
information is available. The second case considers the case with only global broadcast and social 
media, without neighbor observations. The third case considers the scenario with only global 
broadcast and neighbor observations, without social media. Table 3.1 lists the values of the key 
parameters in the model.  
Table 3.1. The Values of Model Parameters  
Scenario j  j  j  j  ,j tp
a j    
Case 1 1(0) b 0 0 
0.5(0.1) 0.1(0.1) U(0.1, 0.9)c 1 Case 2 0.5(0.1) 0.5(0.1) 0 
Case 3 0.5(0.1) 0 0.5(0.1) 
a
,j tp  is the probability that agent j receives information from multiple sources to update his 
opinion at time step t.  
b
1 2( )x x  indicates the mean value of the variable is 1x , and the coefficient of variation VC  of 
the variable is 2x .  
c
1 2( ,  )U x x means the value of the parameter is sampled from a uniform distribution in which 
the lower and upper bound of sample space is set as 1x and 2x , respectively. 
 
Figure 3.3 provides an overview of a randomly selected agent’s opinion trajectory S  
under the three model parameter cases, as well as overall statistics on all agents. By comparing 
Cases 1 and 2, it can be noticed that, with the presence of social media, agents’ opinions update in 
a smoother manner as a function of time (comparing Figure 3.3a and Figure 3.3d). There is also 
less variance among agents’ opinions in Case 2, which results in a cascade-like pattern for opinion 





with Case 1, implying that social media could slow down the speed of agents’ opinion update. This 
result is consistent with the findings by Bassett et al. [2012].  
In Case 3, when agents’ opinion exchange only occurs through neighbor observation, the 
individual agent’s opinion trajectory is smoother than that in Case 1. This indicates that 
information exchange, either by social media or by neighbor observation, can make agents’ 
opinion trajectory smoother and reduce the variance in agents’ opinions (red lines in Figures 3.3f 
and 3.3i). However, agents do not reach opinion consensus in Case 3. A few agents’ opinions are 
less than 1 at the end of the simulation (e.g., agent 145 in Figure 3.3g). As illustrated by the blue 
line in Figure 3.3i, agents’ average opinion is less than, although very close to, 1 in the end.  
 
Figure 3.3 (a) The opinion trajectory for a randomly selected agent in Case 1. (b) The opinion 





Figure 3.3 (cont.) of all the agents’ opinions in Case 1. Figures 3.3d-3.3f and 3.3g-3.3i present the 
corresponding results for Cases 2 and 3, respectively.   
 We further investigate how the agents’ opinion dynamics affect their evacuation processes 
under these three cases (Figure 3.4). Notice that the agents in Case 1 start to take evacuation actions 
earlier than Cases 2 or 3 (the green lines in Figures 3.4c, 3.4f and 3.4i). This is consistent with the 
results presented in Figure 3.3, which shows that information exchange through either social media 
or neighbor observations will slow down the speed of agents’ opinion update. However, there is 
no noticeable difference in the percentage of agents at status 2 over time (i.e., agents that 
successfully evacuate to the destination, corresponding to the red lines in Figures 3.4c, 3.4f and 
3.4i). We also notice that all the agents in Cases 1 and 2 eventually choose to evacuate. In 
comparison, some agents in Case 3 do not evacuate (e.g., Figures 3.4g-3.4h). This suggests that 
the decision-making rule based on neighbors’ actions sometimes will keep some agents from 






Figure 3.4 (a) The evacuation status of a randomly selected agent in Case 1. (b) All agents’ 
evacuation status in Case 1. (c) The percentage of each type of agents as a function of time in Case 
1. Figures d-f and g-i present the corresponding results for Cases 2 and 3, respectively.  
3.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Next, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to understand the influence of agents’ opinion 
adherence parameter (  ) and weighting parameters ( , ,   ) on agents’ ensemble opinion 
trajectory S  , decision trajectory X  , and evacuation rate  .  
Figures 3.5a-3.5c show the impacts of opinion adherence parameter   on the model results. 
The figures indicate that a smaller   (i.e., agents adhere more to their past opinions) will slow 





rates  . However, the influence of   on agents’ evacuation rate    is not as significant 
compared with opinion update S   and evacuation actions X  . This is due to the constraint 
of traffic capacity as implied by Figure 3.4. We expect that   will have a stronger impact on     
with less traffic bottlenecking. 
Figures 3.5d-3.5i show the influences of ,   and   on the modeling results. It is 
observed that, in both Cases 2 and 3, a decrease in   (i.e., the global broadcast has less impact 
on agents’ opinion update) will slow down the speed of agents’ opinion update S  , evacuation 
actions X   and evacuation rates  . There are no opinion updates and evacuation actions 
when   is small enough (e.g., 0.1   in Figures 3.5g-3.5i) in Case 3. Under these conditions, 
agents’ opinions remain unchanged because their opinions are mainly affected by their neighbors’ 
actions. For each member in the group, an agent will not update his opinion if his neighbors do not 
take evacuation actions. This in turn results in no opinion updates and no agent will evacuate in 






Figure 3.5 The impact of the opinion adherence parameter   on (a) agents’ opinion trajectory S 
, (b) decision trajectory X  , and (c) evacuation rate    for Case 1. The impact of   on 
agents’ (d) opinion trajectory S  , (e) decision trajectory X  , and (f) evacuation rate    
for Case 2. The corresponding results for Case 3 are presented in Figures g-i. Note that 0.5   for 






3.3.3 Impacts of Social Media on Agents’ Evacuation Processes  
The sensitivity analysis of the previous section considers at most two information sources 
simultaneously. In this section, we consider all three information sources (i.e., global broadcast, 
social media, and neighbor observation as illustrated in Figure 3.6a) and evaluate how they jointly 
affect agents’ opinion dynamics and evacuation processes. In particular, we analyze the impacts 
of social media on the modeling results.  
Figure 3.6b shows the agents’ evacuation rates under different settings of influence 
parameters ,  ,  and    . The modeling results provide several implications. First, we observe that 
the system can achieve a high evacuation rate when global broadcast has a large influence on 
agents’ opinion dynamics (i.e.,   is large, corresponding to zone B in Figure 3.6b). In contrast, 
agents’ evacuation rate is low when neighbor observation has large influence (i.e.,   is large, 
corresponding to zone A in Figure 3.6b). 
Second, increasing influence of social media will make the system more sensitive to the 
influence of other information sources (i.e., from zone C to D and E in Figure 3.6b). For example, 
a small change in  or   leads to a significant change in agents’ evacuation rates in zone E. 
Social media result in lower evacuation rates when the influence of global information decreases 
(indicated by the solid arrow in Figure 3.6b). On the other hand, social media will increase 
evacuation rates when the influence of global broadcast increases (indicated by the dashed arrow 
in Figure 3.6b). 
The results suggest that the influence of the global forecast  is crucially important to 
agents’ evacuation behaviors. No agents will evacuate if the influence of global information is 





The local government’s flood warning was not on time, many local residents did not take 
evacuation actions, and more than 150 people lost their lives in the flood [Makinen, 2016].  
 
Figure 3.6 (a) Illustration of the scenarios that consider influences of the three information sources. 
(b) Ternary plot of agents’ evacuation rates (t 1000)    under different settings of influence 
parameters ,  ,  and    .  
The results here also show that communication through social media decreases the 
variation among individuals’ opinions and causes them to take actions at a similar pace. This is in 
line with empirical observations of herd-like behaviors during emergency situations, in which 
some people simply follow others’ actions [Schelling, 1973; Haque, 1995; Watts, 2002]. Social 
media ease sharing of individual opinions and enhance influence on others’ decision making, and 
thus could cause unexpected collective behaviors or even chaos (e.g., the “salt-rush” in China after 
the 2011 Japan nuclear crisis [Brenhouse, 2011]).  
3.3.4 Impacts of Stubborn Agents Escalated by Social Media  
Many previous studies have indicated that some agents insist on their own opinions and 





typically referred to as stubborn agents in the study of opinion dynamics [Ghaderi and Srikant, 
2014]. For example, in the case of the 2007 Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, thousands of individuals 
remained in their homes despite receiving early warnings and evacuation orders from emergency 
managers [Paul and Dutt, 2010]. This section investigates how the behaviors of stubborn agents 
affect the opinion dynamics and evacuation processes of the entire community.  
In this study, stubborn agents’ opinions are set as 0 over the entire simulation time. Figure 
3.7 presents the entire population’s average opinions and evacuation rates corresponding with 
various percentages of stubborn agents in the group. The results show that stubborn agents can 
prevent the entire group from updating their opinions to high levels and therefore reduce agents’ 
evacuation rates, especially when there are many stubborn agents or social media weighting is 
higher (   is larger). For example, the agents’ evacuation rates decrease from 80% to 58% when 
the percentage of stubborn agents increases from 10% to 20% (the red line in Figure 3.7b). With a 
fixed 5% of stubborn agents in the group, the agents’ evacuation rates are reduced to 94%, 91%, 
and 73% when   is 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, respectively (Figure 3.7b). In particular, as can be seen, 
evacuation rates respond to the percentage of stubborn agents in a non-linear manner when social 
media become more influential. When the percentage of stubborn agents exceeds a threshold (e.g., 
5% in Figure 3.7b for the red line), the impact of stubborn agents on evacuation rates will be 
intensified by sources of information. Stronger social media can significantly reduce evacuation 
rates (e.g., in the case of 10% stubborn agents, evacuation rates decrease from 90% to 80% when 






Figure 3.7 The impacts of stubborn agents on agents’ (a) average opinion (t 1000)S   and (b) 
evacuation rates (t 1000)   .  
 Figure 3.8 illustrates how the impacts of stubborn agents on the evacuation rate are affected 
by the weights of multiple information sources. Figure 3.8a displays agents’ evacuation rates with 
5% stubborn agents in the group. It is noticed that the patterns of the agents’ evacuation rates are 
consistent with those shown in Figure 3.6b (e.g., zone A has a low evacuation rate due to limited 
influence of global flood warnings). However, the evacuation rate in Figure 3.8a changes in a 
smoother manner. Figure 3.8b compares the differences between the cases with (Figure 3.8a, 5% 
stubborn agents) and without stubborn agents (Figure 3.6b). It is noticed that the impact of 
stubborn agents increases from regions C to D and E. This implies that social media, as they 
become more influential, make the evacuation process more vulnerable to stubborn agents. This is 
shown in some real world incidences of inaccurate and misleading information from social media, 
e.g., altered images and false news about the flood conditions during the days of Hurricane Sandy 





agents in the community and correct the misinformation that they broadcast through social media 
in a timely manner during a crisis.     
 
Figure 3.8 (a) Ternary plot of agents’ evacuation rates (t 1000)    with 5% of stubborn agents 
in the group, and (b) the differences in (t 1000)    between the scenario with 5% of stubborn 
agents (Figure 3.8a) and the scenario without stubborn agents (Figure 3.6b).   
3.3.5 Impacts of Flood Forecast Quality and Transportation Capacity   
Lastly, we investigate the impacts of two other key factors on agents’ opinion dynamics 
and evacuation processes: flood forecast quality and transportation capacity.  
Figures 3.9a-3.9c show that the quality of the flood forecast can significantly affect agents’ 
opinions on flood risk and evacuation rates. Poor quality of flood warnings (i.e., with smaller  ) 
results in slower update of flood risk awareness (Figure 3.9b) and fewer agents choosing to 
evacuate (Figure 3.9c). This concurs with the need for improving the reliability of flood warnings 






Figure 3.9 (a) A simple model of flood forecast quality with smaller   for poorer forecast. (b) 
Agents’ opinion trajectories under scenarios of different flood risk forecast qualities when
( , , ) (0.3,0.4,0.3).     (c) The joint impacts of weighting parameters for information sources (
,  ,  and    ) and forecast quality ( ) on agents’ evacuation rate (when the residential density 
is set as 20d  ). (d) The joint impacts of weighting parameters and residential density on agents’ 
evacuation rate (when 0  ). 
 Furthermore, we assess the joint impacts of multiple modeling parameters, i.e., flood 
forecast uncertainty, residential density (a substitute for network capacity), and weights of 
information sources, on agents’ evacuation rates (Figures 3.9c-3.9d). In general, the figures show 
that evacuation rates are higher when global flood warnings are more influential (  is larger), 





However, the impacts of each individual parameter on the modeling results also depend on other 
parameters. The complex interplay of these parameters is summarized as follows.  
First, under a poor flood forecast scenario (e.g., 0  ) , the quality of flood warnings 
becomes a dominant factor that affects the modeling results. When flood forecast improves (  
becomes larger), the weighting parameters for information sources ( ,  ,  and    ) become more 
important factors. It is also noticed that more influential social media can slow down the increase 
of agents’ evacuation rates with improved flood forecast (Figure 3.9c). Second, when the 
residential density is low (e.g., 10d  ), the weighting parameters for information sources are the 
dominant factors on agents’ evacuation rates. In contrast, when residential density is high (e.g., 
90d  ), the weighting parameters have little impact on the modeling results (Figure 3.9d). These 
findings suggest that the quality of flood warnings and residential density determine the range of 
agents’ evacuation rates. In comparison, the weighting parameters of the information sources 
determine the actual evacuation rates based on the influence of the various information sources. 
When flood warning and residential density are not hard constraints (e.g., 0; 30d    in Figures 
3.9c-3.9d), the weighting parameters of the information sources become the dominant factors that 
affect agents’ evacuation processes. This highlights that crisis management in flood events requires 
(1) satisfactory flood forecasts, (2) efficient flood warning dissemination systems, and (3) well-
planned evacuation procedures in a community with low residential density and high 
transportation capacity [Litman, 2006; Murray-Tuite and Wolshon, 2013].  
3.4 Conclusions  
In this study, we develop an agent-based modeling framework that couples a general 





flood evacuation processes. The coupled model simulates agents’ opinion dynamics and 
evacuation processes under the influence of multiple information sources, flood forecast quality, 
and transportation systems. The results show that stronger social media can make evacuation 
processes more sensitive to the change of global flood warnings and/or neighbor observations, and 
thus, impose larger uncertainty on evacuation processes (i.e., a large range of evacuation rates 
corresponding to the change of global information and/or neighbor observation). We also find that 
evacuation rates respond to the percentage of stubborn agents in a non-linear manner. After the 
percentage of stubborn agents exceeds a threshold, the impact of stubborn agents on evacuation 
rates will be intensified by sources of information, and stronger social media can significantly 
reduce evacuation rates under this condition. Therefore, social media impose uncertainties to the 
flood evacuation processes and complicate evacuation planning and coordination during flood 
events.  
Our results highlight the importance of mapping inaccurate or misleading information in 
social media and identifying stubborn individuals to allow first responders and emergency 
managers to mitigate any undesirable influences. In addition, flood warnings with low quality and 
high residential density can result in low evacuation rates, which highlights the need for improving 
the quality flood warnings and transportation infrastructure during flooding events.   
Opinion formation, flood risk perception, and evacuation decision are complex processes 
that need both empirical and theoretical investigation from interdisciplinary fields [Haque, 1995; 
Parker et al., 2007b; Gladwin et al., 2009]. Social media not only provide efficient communication 
platforms for individuals to exchange information, but also create large amounts of data that 
describe people’s behaviors. These data can be collected and analyzed by advanced data query and 





2017]. Synthetic models, such as the one presented in this study, can benefit from these data and 
technologies for model verification and calibration. Recommended future studies include the use 
of empirical data to measure the various behavioral parameters, validating or modifying 
assumptions in the opinion dynamics simulation, extending the model to more realistic and 
complex transportation networks, and incorporating uncertainties in spatial and temporal 







Chapter IV. Impacts of the Interplay of Farmers’ Behaviors on an Agricultural Water 
Market 
This chapter addresses the issue of simulating multiple behaviors, using drought as a case 
study. Farmers’ multiple behaviors, namely irrigation behavior and bidding behavior, are 
incorporated in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. The joint impacts of the 
behavioral parameters on the water market are evaluated under different hydrological conditions.  
4.1 Introduction 
 Irrigation is the primary water consumer in many regions around the world [Donohew, 
2009; Wang, 2012]. Satisfying agricultural water demand has become more challenging due to 
population growth and competing water demands from municipal and industrial sectors, especially 
during drought events. Under conditions of water scarcity, water markets are considered efficient 
instruments to reallocate water and increase crop production because they can enable water to be 
transferred from  low-value uses to high-value uses [Hearne and Easter, 1997; Easter et al., 1999; 
Yoskowitz, 1999; Adler, 2009; Palazzo and Brozović, 2014].  
In the past decades, many regions have proposed and/or implemented a variety of water-
trading programs for both surface water and groundwater resources management [Saliba, 1987; 
Dragun and Gleeson, 1989; Hamilton et al., 1989; Chang and Griffin, 1992; Griffin and Boadu, 
1992; Murphy et al., 2000; Raffensperger and Milke, 2005; Brennan, 2006; Raffensperger et al., 
2009; Bauer, 2010; Grafton and Horne, 2014]. Some studies also propose to address 
environmental issues in the context of water markets [Iftekhar et al., 2013; Kuwayama and 
Brozović, 2013]. However, it is widely recognized that water markets do not function as well as 





potential benefits of water markets are influenced by a variety of institutional, environmental and 
economic factors, including but not limited to (1) water rights legislation and institutional 
developments that clearly define water rights and facilitate water trading among water right holders 
[Griffin, 1998; Bjornlund, 2003; Howe and Goemans, 2003; Turral et al., 2005; Brozović and 
Young, 2014], (2) transaction costs (e.g., the cost of finding trading partners and trading water) and 
third-party effects (e.g., downstream stakeholders might be affected by water trading in upstream) 
[Colby, 1990; Pujol et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2007; Donohew, 2009; Wang, 2012; Erfani et al., 2014], 
(3) hydrological conditions [Pujol et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2007; Kuwayama and Brozović, 2013; 
Palazzo and Brozović, 2014], and (4) the behaviors of water users (i.e., water sellers and buyers in 
a water market) [Easter et al., 1998; Bjornlund, 2003; Nguyen et al., 2013]. In this paper, we will 
analyze the impacts of water users’ behaviors on the performance of agricultural water markets.   
In agricultural systems and water markets, farmers’ decision making for irrigation and 
water trading are complex and may vary from farmer to farmer, from region to region, and from 
year to year. Many studies simulate farmers’ water use behaviors and/or evaluating the potential 
benefits of water markets under a variety of hydrological and institutional conditions [Garrido, 
2000; Tisdell, 2001; Iftekhar et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2015]. However, these 
studies in general have two limitations. First, farmers are typically simulated as homogeneous 
decision makers [Tisdell, 2001; van Heerden et al., 2008], but the heterogeneity in farmers’ 
individual irrigation decision-making (e.g., risk aversion to crop water deficit) is not explicitly 
captured in these models. However, studies have shown that farmers’ decision-making can be 
affected by their own perceptions, experiences and social networks [Mertz et al., 2009; Deressa et 





Second, to simulate farmers’ trading decisions, previous studies typically use optimization 
methods to represent farmers’ water-trading behaviors in order to evaluate the performance of 
water markets [Characklis et al., 1999; Garrido, 2000; Pujol et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2007; Erfani 
et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2015]. However, the assumptions behind the optimization methods (e.g., 
symmetric and sufficient information available for all farmers to find trading partners, efficient 
bargaining process for farmers to determine water price, etc.) can rarely be satisfied in the real 
world [Nguyen et al., 2013]. Studies have shown that the performance of markets can be greatly 
affected by market participants’ individual trading strategies, which are not necessarily fully 
rational and can prevent water markets from being perfectly competitive [David and Wen, 2000; 
Hao, 2000; Rodriguez and Anders, 2004; Vytelingum et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011; Nguyen et al 
2013]. Thus, following the argument of Nguyen et al. [2013], it can be more practical to simulate 
water markets based on a set of trading rules and market structures.  
To represent and simulate individuals’ heterogeneous behaviors, agent-based modeling 
(ABM) has been used in many studies in a variety of domains, including decision making in social 
and economic sciences [Bonabeau, 2002; Farmer and Foley, 2009; Berglund, 2015; van Duinen 
et al., 2016]. Unlike the centralized top-down approach, ABM follows a bottom-up approach to 
simulate systems with a group of autonomous, interdependent, and adaptive decision makers 
(defined as agents) [Macy and Willer, 2002; Kirman and Tuinstra, 2005; An, 2012]. ABM can 
explicitly represent the heterogeneous attributes and behaviors of each agent at the bottom level, 
and then aggregates the behaviors of all individual agents to explore the complex emergent 
phenomena at the system level [Rand and Rust, 2011].  
In recent years, there have been several studies applying ABM to simulate farmers’ 





Miro [2012] incorporates a behavioral parameter in an ABM to represent farmers’ sensitivity to 
soil water deficit. Ng et al. [2011] develop an ABM to simulate farmers’ land use decisions in the 
context of biofuels development. They explicitly incorporate multiple behavioral parameters in the 
model to simulate farmers’ responses to the variability of weather and crop prices. Noël and Cai 
[2017] demonstrate that model outputs can be influenced by including individual heterogeneities. 
Other studies have focused on applying ABM to simulating markets for water resources and 
emission credits [Zhang et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2012; Iftekhar et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2013]. 
In particular, Zhang et al. [2010] and Nguyen et al. [2013] simulate auction markets for sulfur 
dioxide and wastewater pollution credits, respectively, in which agents’ trading behaviors are 
represented by a set of behavioral parameters that describe agents’ degree of rent seeking when 
making bids and learning rate for updating bidding strategies.  
According to our knowledge, this study is the first to combine farmers’ irrigation behaviors 
[Miro, 2012; Noël and Cai, 2017] and bidding behaviors [Zhang et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2013] 
in an ABM to simulate their joint impacts on an agricultural water market. The model allows us to 
explore the interplay of these factors and their joint impacts on water market performance under 
different hydrological conditions. This extends the models developed by Miro [2012], Zhang et al. 
[2010] or Nguyen et al. [2013] by evaluating how multiple behavioral parameters jointly affect the 
model outputs and how the impacts and interplay of the parameters vary under different 
hydrological conditions. In addition, unlike previous water market simulations that operate at 
annual or seasonal time scale [Yang et al., 2012; Iftekhar et al., 2013], we simulate a daily water 
market that allows exploration of the impacts of agents’ behavioral parameters on daily price 





The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 and 4.3 introduce the 
methodology and case study, respectively. The modeling results are presented in Section 4.4, 
followed by discussions in Section 4.5 and conclusions in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Methodology 
This section introduces the mechanisms of the agricultural water market, the agent-based 
model used to simulate farmers’ behaviors, and model construction and execution process.  
4.2.1 Mechanisms of the Water Market 
Empirically, water rights are typically traded in two ways in water markets: permanent sale 
and short-term lease [Brennan, 2006; Hansen et al., 2015]. The former refers to trade of water 
entitlement while the latter refers to lease of water use rights without transfers of water right 
entitlement [Easter et al., 1999]. Short-term lease does not change water entitlements and provides 
flexibilities for water right holders to make decisions in the face of uncertainties about future water 
availability. Studies have shown that water right holders traded much more water through short-
term leasing than permanent sale [Turral et al., 2005; Donohew, 2009]. In this study, we simulate 
short-term leasing water markets. Farmers can buy water permits from, or sell them to, other 
farmers without changing the ownership of their water right entitlements. Furthermore, following 
Broadbent et al. [2010], which describes the institutional framework for the operation of real-time 
water markets, this study simulates a water market that operates at a daily time scale.  
This study adopts auction as a trading mechanism that has been promoted by experimental 
economists and applied to numerous market studies [Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Posada and Lóoez-
Paredes, 2008; Zhang et al., 2010; Bai, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2013]. An auction is a typical trading 
mechanism for people to trade goods. Among various types of auction mechanisms, the double 





been implemented in the real world (e.g., Australia, U.S.) [Howe, 1997; Bjornlund, 2003; Brozović 
and Young, 2014] and many other studies [Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Posada and Lóoez-Paredes, 
2008; Bai, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2013]. The double auction can function as either uniform-price 
auction (i.e., all units in the market are traded at the same price) or discriminatory-price auction 
(i.e., units are traded at different prices) [Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Jackson and Kremer, 2006]. As 
shown by Jackson and Kremer [2006], if the supply is fixed, then either a uniform price auction 
or discriminatory price auction leads to efficient allocations. For the market designed for this study, 
the total amount of water permits to trade is fixed. Thus, either of two market mechanisms satisfies 
the efficient condition. We simulate the discriminatory-price double auction, in which each agent’s 
transaction price depends on his own bid price. This takes the advantage of an ABM that simulates 
the heterogeneous behaviors of bidding decisions.  
The procedures of the market operations are described as follows. At the beginning of each 
day, the water market opens to receive farmers’ bids. Each bid will specify the name of the bidder, 
the bid price, and the amount of permitted water allocations to trade (Note that the term “amount 
of permitted water allocations” is abbreviated to “water permits” in the following sections). Then 
the market will collect all of the bids and match them to result in transactions in the following way. 
Sellers’ (buyers’) bids are sorted in ascending (descending) order according to their bid prices. The 
buyer with the highest bid price will be matched with the seller with the lowest bid price. A 
transaction will occur if the bid price of the buyer is higher than the bid price of the seller. The 
transaction price is set as the average of the two bid prices and the transaction amount is set as the 
smaller of the two bid amounts. If the buyer’s and seller’s bid amounts are not equal, the bid with 





continues until the highest bid price of buyers is lower than the lowest bid price of sellers. For 
detailed descriptions of the matching process, see Nguyen et al. [2013].  
After the matching process, the water market informs each market participant of the 
transaction results. The transaction results include the following information: (1) whether the 
previous bid has resulted in transactions, (2) the trade price, and (3) the trade amount. In the 
proposed sealed-bid auction market, agents present their own individual bids, but they do not 
necessarily share their bids to and/or deduce the bids of their transaction partners. Such complex 
processes are not simulated in our model. Instead, we assume that the market authority will release 
the average trade price of implemented transactions to the public [Bjornlund, 2003]. In this way, 
agents, including those who do not participate in the market and/or whose bids do not result in 
transactions, are able to obtain some information about the market prices, which supports the 
learning processes (as illustrated in Figure 4.1).  
 





4.2.2 Agents and Behaviors 
In this study, each farmer is simulated as a computer agent, which is described by a set of 
parameters representing the agent’s attributes and behavioral rules. We primarily focus on two 
types of behaviors in this work, namely irrigation behavior and bidding behavior.  
(1) Irrigation Behavior 
Farmers’ irrigation decisions (e.g., when and with how much water to irrigate crops) can 
depend on many factors, including their observations of soil dryness, plants’ response to water 
deficit, water availability, observation of other farmers’ actions especially those nearby, and 
suggestions from technicians such as crop advisors [Jones, 2004; USDA, 2008; Andales et al., 
2011; van Duinen et al., 2016]. In this study, we follow previous studies and assume that farmers’ 
irrigation decisions are driven by maintaining a certain level of soil moisture to reduce crop yield 
losses or increase profits [Jones, 2004; Foster et al., 2014]. Following this concept that has been 
adopted in previous studies on farmers’ decision making [Steduto et al., 2009; Andales et al., 
2011], we use the water balance approach to simulate farmers’ irrigation decisions. In this 
approach, farmers compare water deficit in soil ( cD ) and  management allowed water deficit (
MADd ) for the crop and apply irrigation practices when cD exceeds MADd  [Allen et al., 1998]. It is 
assumed that information about soil moisture, crop growth, and climate are available to all of the 
farmers through an information provider (Figure 4.1), thus farmers can follow this standard rule 
to guide their irrigation practices.  
As mentioned above, farmers’ irrigation decisions can be affected by many factors and 
their irrigation decisions may vary, leading to behavioral heterogeneity [Andriyas and McKee, 
2014; van Duinen et al., 2015]. To represent this heterogeneity, we include a behavioral parameter

 





[2017].   is a non-negative, dimensionless parameter that measures the degree of a farmer’s 
sensitivity to soil water deficit (i.e., a larger   represents a farmer that is less sensitive to water 
deficit). The irrigation decision of a farmer is represented by equation (1).  
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(2) Bidding Behavior and Learning 
Bidding behavior describes how an agent makes strategic bidding decisions to trade water 
permits in the market and how the agent updates its bidding strategy by learning from its trade 
experiences. In this study, each agent has a water permit, which constrains the maximum amount 
of water the agent can withdraw from river. Agents can enter the market to make a bid to buy or 
sell their water permits. The bid consists of three variables: (1) the agent’s role in the market, 
denoted by a categorical variable r (-1 for selling a water permit, 1 for buying water permits, and 
0 for not participating in the market); (2) bid price ( p , $/acre-feet); and (3) bid amount ( q , acre-
feet). Agents who have used their entire water permits have to buy permits from other agents to 
satisfy their irrigation demands (r = 1). Agents who have leftover water permits can sell part of 
their permits to the agents who need them (r = -1). Agents that do not have leftover water permits 
will not participate in the water market (r = 0) if they do not need to irrigate crops.  
It is assumed that agents’ decision-making on bid price is affected by two factors: (1) 
reservation price ( ) that presents an upper bound (for water buyers) or lower bound (for water 
sellers) of the bid price, and (2) rent seeking (  ) that measures the degree of the agent’s 
greediness to pursue profit from trade [Cliff and Bruten, 1997]. By denoting agent i’s reservation 
price and rent seeking at time t as ,i t  and ,i t , respectively, the agent’s bid price ,i tp  can be 
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In this study, agents’ reservation prices depend on the marginal benefit of irrigation water 
use and transaction cost for water trade. The marginal benefit of irrigation depends on crop price, 
crop-growing stage, soil properties, irrigation cost, and other agronomic parameters; therefore, 
agents’ reservation prices will vary over time for an individual farmer and vary across farmers. 
We assume there is a transaction cost for each unit of traded water permit. Transaction cost can be 
set as a constant cost (e.g., registration cost for participating in the market) plus a trading cost for 
each transaction (e.g., tax for trading) [Luo et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2010]. In this study, we 
assume there is no registration cost for market participation, and the transaction cost is dependent 
on the amount of transacted water use permits and trading price. Coefficient of transaction cost (
 ) is used to measure the ratio of trading cost relative to the trading price for water permit (e.g., 
for a transaction with trading price p and trade amount Q, transaction cost can be represented by 
pQ ). A larger   is associated with a higher transaction cost.   
As mentioned above, when making a bid in the market, a buyer (seller) will always bid a 
price lower (higher) than his reservation price in order to gain profit. The larger the value of rent 
seeking (  ) is, the more profit the agent aims to gain from trade ( [0,  1]  for buyers, and 1   
for sellers). In this context, whether the two bids from a buyer and a seller can result in a transaction 
depends on: (1) if the buyer’s reservation price is higher than the seller’s (i.e., a transaction can 
happen only when the buyer’s reservation price is higher than the seller’s), (2) agents’ degree of 
rent seeking, and (3) transaction cost for water trade. If buyers and sellers both have a high degree 
of rent seeking, or transaction cost for water trade is high, their bid prices will diverge more from 





After receiving the transaction results from the auction center, an agent will learn from the 
results and adapt its bid strategies for the next round. The adaptation process requires agents to 
have some level of intelligence. Some studies have explored the level of intelligence that could 
make agents achieve human-level performance in markets. Gode and Sunder [1993] proposed 
Zero-Intelligence (ZI) agents and found that the ZI agents could achieve market equilibrium as 
long as the bids do not result in loss-making transactions. Based upon this work, Cliff and Bruten 
[1997] proposed Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) agents that incorporate a machine-learning 
algorithm to update agents’ degree of rent seeking based on previous transaction results. They 
showed that the performance of ZIP agents is more robust than that of ZI agents. A series of 
laboratory experiments conducted by Das et al., [2001] further demonstrated that ZIP agents could 
obtain larger gains from trade than ZI agents in the auction experiments because of behavioral 
improvements via machine learning. A number of studies have adopted ZIP agents’ learning 
strategies in simulating different types of markets such as emission allowance markets [Zhang et 
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2013], energy markets [Nicolaisen et al., 2001; 
Pourebrahimi et al., 2008; Fagiani and Hakvoort, 2014] and financial markets [Vytelingum et al., 
2008].  
In this study, we apply the learning strategies of the ZIP agent to simulate farmers’ learning 
process. ZIP agents’ learning process is represented by a behavioral parameter, learning rate ( 
), as shown in equation (3).  
 , 1 , , ,( ) /i t i t i t i t i tp         (3) 
where t  is the target price at t, which is set as the transaction price if agent i’s bid at time t results 
in transactions, or the average market price for water released by the market if the agent’s bid does 





agent i ’s learning rate, which is a dimensionless number ( [0,  1]  ). An agent with a larger   
changes its degree of rent seeking by a greater value than those with a smaller   (the agent will 
not change its degree of rent seeking when 0  ). A momentum coefficient is typically introduced 
in ZIP bidding strategies to consider the randomness in agents’ degree of rent seeking. For a more 
detailed description of the ZIP agent, see Cliff and Bruten [1997].  
Quantification of agents’ behavioral parameters is challenging if empirical knowledge of 
the distribution of agents’ behaviors is lacking. Previous studies often address this challenge by 
assuming agents’ behavioral parameters follow certain distributions (e.g., uniform or normal 
distributions) [An, 2012; Bruch and Atwell, 2015]. The normal distribution has been widely used 
in previous studies to introduce heterogeneity in agents’ behaviors for sensitivity analysis [Marino 
et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2013; Bertella et al., 2014]. In this study, due to the lack of available 
data, we use normal distributions to sample the behavioral parameters (i.e., ,  ,  and    ) for 
sensitivity analysis for each scenario. Note that it is also feasible to use other distributions (e.g., 
uniform distribution). The next section provides details on how these behavioral parameters are 
assigned in each scenario.  
ABMs typically face difficulty in model validation when empirical data are not sufficient 
[Manson, 2003; Ngo and See, 2011; Huang et al., 2013]. To address this issue, Manson [2013] 
proposes two model validation methods for ABMs: (1) structure validation that measures how well 
the model represents theoretical mechanisms and expert opinions, and (2) outcome validation that 
measures how well the model outputs fit empirical data. This study mainly focuses on understand 
some theoretical questions regarding human behaviors in a hypothetical water market, rather than 
on comparing our model results with observed trading data. Therefore, in the current study we 





farmers’ irrigation decisions (e.g., [Steduto et al., 2009; Noël and Cai, 2017]) and agents’ 
behaviors in markets (e.g., [Smith, 1982; Cliff and Bruten, 1997; Nguyen et al., 2013]). In future 
if the water market is implemented in the real world, we can perform “outcome validation” when 
observed water trading data become available.  
4.2.3 Model Implementation  
We construct the agent-based model in the object-oriented programming language Java. 
Table  lists the key environmental, economic, institutional, and behavioral parameters for model 
input. Figure 4.2 depicts the flowchart of the model execution process. The model starts with the 
selection of a simulation year and agents’ behavioral parameters for model construction. Then the 
model will simulate each agent’s irrigation and bidding behaviors during the crop-growing season. 
At the end of each simulation year, the model will calculate crop production and evaluate the 
performance of the agricultural water market.  
Table 4.1 List of variables associated with agricultural system and agent’s behaviors 
Factors Variable Meaning[unit] 
Environmental and agronomic Loc Geographical location (i.e., latitude and longitude) [-] 
ET Crop evapotranspiration [inch/day] 
P Precipitation [inch/day] 
ST Soil type (e.g., clay, sand, loam) [-] 
CA Crop area [acre] 
CY Crop yield [bushel/acre] 
IC Irrigation cost [$/acre-feet] 
IE Irrigation efficiency [-] 
LF Leaching fraction for salinity control [-] 
Institutional WP Water permit [acre-feet] 
  Coefficient of transaction cost for water trading [-] 
Economic PC Price of crop [$/bushel] 











Sensitivity to soil water deficit [-] 
  Rent seeking [-]  
  Learning rate [-]  
Note: [-] denotes dimensionless variable.  
 
In this study, the performance of the water market is mainly measured by a matrix with two 
indicators at the system (watershed) level: (1) increased crop production (ICP, bushel), which is 
the difference of the total crop production (TCP) between the scenario with and without the water 
market, and (2) total traded water permit (TTW, acre-feet) in the water market. We also evaluate 
the relative water market performance (RMP) that compares the ICP of the agent-based water 
market and the optimization-based water market (i.e., model B2 in Table 4.2). Note that there are 
other indicators to measure the performance of water markets (e.g., equity of water permit 











4.3 Case Study and Experimental Design  
 To assess the effects of farmers’ behaviors using the model developed in section 4.2, we 
develop a hypothetical water market as a case study, based on a range of precipitation experienced 
recently in a Texas watershed, including the severe drought of 2011, the normal year of 2010, and 
wet year of 2007. Using this case study, experiments are designed to evaluate impacts of the 
behavioral parameters and hydrologic conditions on market performance. 
4.3.1 Overview of the Case Study Area 
We apply the water market model to the Guadalupe River Basin (GRB) in south Texas, a 
southwestern state within the United States. The GRB encompasses an area of 3,256 2km  
(~800,000 acres) (Figure 4.3a), with irrigation as one of the largest water consumers. The Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) regulates surface water resources.  The water right 
holders’ water permits, which we obtained from a TCEQ database, have been defined by the water 
law and their water uses are monitored by water masters employed by TCEQ [Garcia et al., 2009]. 
There are in total 334 irrigation water right holders (corresponding to 334 agents in the model) 
distributed in 11 counties in the GRB. Water permits are not equally allocated among farmers. 
Some farmers’ water permits allow much less water withdrawals than other farmers’ (Figure 4.3b), 
which provides potential for water permits to be traded during drought events.  
At the daily time scale, for rivers with a certain length (such as the study site, ~300 km), it 
is reasonable to assume that all farmers, upstream or downstream, can withdrawal some amount 
of water that satisfies their normal daily water demand. We assume the river is a common “lake” 
and upstream-downstream issues and streamflow hydrology do not affect the trade transaction. 
Since total water sought is equal to total water bought under the double auction, the daily 





at different segments of the river may be more or less affected depending on the locations of water 
sellers and buyers.  
In order to simplify the agricultural system without addressing the complex decisions on 
crop choice, we assume the agents plant corn (i.e., the major crop planted in this area) on their 
croplands following the same crop planting and harvesting schedule. In this study, the agents are 
assumed to plant corn on March 16th and harvest on August 2nd (140 days in total), following the 
recommended date for corn’s growing season in central Texas (http://www.texascorn.org). In 
irrigation practices, irrigation efficiency, leaching fraction for soil salinity control, and irrigation 
cost in the study area are set as 90%, 0.15, and 2.47$/acre-inch, respectively [Letey et al., 2011; 
Wagner, 2012; Foster et al., 2014]. Coefficient of transaction cost for water trade is set as 10%. 
Other data used in the model include soil properties (obtained from USDA soil survey, 
http://websoilsurvey.sc.egov.usda.gov), meteorology data (obtained from Weather Underground, 
http://www.wunderground.com), crop yield and crop price (obtained from USDA statistics 
services, http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov), and water permits and land area for each water user 
(obtained from TCEQ database, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/agency/data).  
 
Figure 4.3 (a) The geographical location of the Guadalupe River Basin; (b) Water permits versus 





In this study, we simulate a hypothetical water market that operates at the daily time scale, 
assuming that the infrastructure and institutional developments needed for the daily market is in 
place [National Water Commission, 2009; Broadbent et al., 2010, 2011]. As mentioned in the 
previous section, an agent’s water permit reflects the average weather condition and does not 
change with weather. Agents with limited water permits will face water shortages in dry years. We 
assume that agents will buy water permits only when the water remaining in their permits (i.e., 
total water permits minus total water withdrawals) cannot satisfy irrigation demand. This 
assumption is reasonable because speculative investments in water permits by those who are not 
in need of water to meet valid uses might impose threat to society [Kaufman, 2012]. Furthermore, 
we assume that agents do not have accurate weather forecast capabilities, and their irrigation 
decisions are only based on current irrigation demand. Previous work show that weather forecast 
has a limited role in farmers’ irrigation scheduling [Wang and Cai, 2009; Cai et al., 2011b; Hejazi 
et al., 2014; Shafiee-Jood et al., 2014]. However, to make the model more realistic, future work 
will be conducted to consider farmers’ different responses to forecasts and forecast uncertainties.   
4.3.2 Experimental Design  
In this study, two other  models are designed for comparison with the agent-based water 
market model, as shown in Table 4.2: (1) a baseline model that represents the scenario without 
water markets (model B1) and (2) a benchmark model that represents the market that would yield 
maximum crop production at the system level (model B2). Specifically, model B2 adopts an 
optimization approach that simulates a water market in which the cropland with highest crop 
productivity uses water first, followed by the lands with relatively lower productivity.  
It is expected that system-level total crop production and total traded water permits from 





model A water market will be highly dependent on agents’ behavioral parameters. Similar to the 
findings of previous studies (e.g., [Rosegrant et al., 2000; Luo et al., 2007]), we expect that the 
water market will yield more increase in crop production in dry years than wet years.  
Table 4.2 Baseline and benchmark models 
Model Model description Behavioral parameters Note 
A Agent-based water market model ,  ,  and      
B1 No water trading among agents   Baseline model 
B2  The water market that yields 
maximum crop production 
  Benchmark model 
 
Scenario-based analysis is applied to evaluate the impacts of farmers’ behaviors on the 
water market. Two experiments are designed as shown in Table 4.3. The first experiment aims at 
exploring the impacts of the agents’ two bidding parameters (i.e., rent seeking  and learning rate
 ) on the water market. The second experiment then introduces multiple scenarios for the 
irrigation parameter (i.e., sensitivity to soil water deficit ) in order to evaluate the joint impacts 
of the three behavioral parameters on the water market.  
Monte-Carlo simulation method is used to obtain the average modeling results for each 
scenario. The procedure consists of three steps. The first step is selecting a particular scenario with 
the mean and coefficient of variation of each set of behavioral parameters in Table 4.3. The second 
step is generating random samples using the behavioral parameters in step one. The number of 
samples is equal to the number of agents (i.e., 334 in this study). The third step is assigning the 





is executed 100 times to obtain the average modeling results for each scenario. Figure 4.4 gives an 
example of parameterizing agents’ behavioral parameters for one particular scenario.  
Table 4.3 Experiments to explore the impacts of agents’ behaviors on the water market 
Parameters 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Mean CV Mean CV 
Sensitivity to soil water deficit   1 
0.2 
0.4~1.6 
0.2 Rent seeking   0~0.8 0~0.8 
Learning rate   0~0.4 0~0.4 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Illustration of the procedure for sampling the agents’ behavioral parameters for one run 
in the Monte-Carlo simulation (i.e., the mean value for ,  ,  and     is 1.2, 0.4, and 0.2, 
respectively; coefficient of variation is 0.2 for ,  ,  and    ).  
4.4 Results  
This section presents the model results and discussion. First, we execute experiment 1 to 





water market. Then, we execute experiment 2 to evaluate the impacts of the irrigation parameter 
and evaluate how the three parameters jointly affect the water market.  
4.4.1 Overview of Model Results for One Set of Parameters 
The model is executed from 2001 to 2013 to evaluate the performance of the water market 
under different hydrological conditions. Figure 4.5 shows the simulation results for a particular 
scenario. Figure 4.5a shows the water-trading results for all of the agents, which indicate a clear 
pattern in agents’ roles in the market. As expected, the agents with more water permits typically 
sell water to the ones with less water permits.  
Four agents (identified from Figure 4.5a) are selected to compare their profit with and 
without the water market (Figure 4.5b), showing different impacts of the water market for different 
agents. With a water market, the total profit increases for all of the agents, especially for those 
with fewer water permits (e.g., agent 162 has a greater increase in total profit than agent 329). 
Agents with more water permits (e.g., agent 300 and agent 216) have reduced crop production 
because they sell a portion of their water permits to other agents, leaving less water to satisfy their 
own irrigation demand. However, the total profit of these agents increases because of the increased 
income from selling water. In addition, buyers with few water permits become active in the market 
earlier and buy more permits through the market than those with more permits (e.g., compare agent 
162 and agent 329), which is in line with intuitive reasoning (i.e., during a drought event, agents 







Figure 4.5 Results of (a) total traded water permits for all of the agents (pink dots represent sellers, 
green dots represent buyers; the size of the dots represents the traded water amount divided by the 
agent’s land area); (b) profits of the four selected agents with and without water market; and (c) 
daily water trade of the four selected agents. Note: Simulation year is 2011; mean values for 
,  ,  and      are 1.0, 0.2, and 0.15, respectively.  
4.4.2 Impacts of Bidding Behaviors 
This section explores the impact of agents’ bidding behaviors on the performance of the 
water market. Figure 4.6 shows the summary of the system-level total crop production (TCP) from 





Figure 4.6 Summary of total crop production for all of the agents under model A (black square), 
model B1 (blue triangle), and model B2 (red circle). Note that the shaded grey area represents the 
range of model A’s possible simulation results.  
First, as expected, TCP with the water market (model A) is always higher than that without 
the water market (model B1), especially under normal (e.g., 2010) and dry conditions (e.g., 2011). 
TCP in wet years (e.g., 2007) is maintained at a relatively high level even without the water market, 
thus the benefit of the water market in wet years is not as significant as that in dry years. This result 
is consistent with Luo et al. [2007].  
Second, TCP of model A varies significantly between the results of model B1 and B2 for 
the drier simulation years. The performance of the water market (model A) highly depends on the 





some particular conditions (e.g., when 0.8   and  0  ), implying that the water market will 
yield no increase in crop production when the agents behave inefficiently in the market.  
On the other hand, model A does not yield the same results as model B2, which means that 
the maximum benefit of the market (i.e., reflected by the optimization model B2) cannot be reached 
in reality if we consider the factors that may constrain the agents’ decision-makings. For example, 
the optimization approach typically assumes that the agents have sufficient information for 
decision-making and are able to make optimal bidding decisions that could yield efficient water 
reallocations. However, this assumption may not be realistic when we consider that agents, in 
reality, typically have limited information from the market to make bidding decisions and the 
bargaining processes between agents are not always efficient, which constrains the performance 
of the market.  
Figure 4.7 specifically shows how the bidding parameters affect performance of the water 
market for three representative hydrological conditions: wet year (2007), normal year (2010) and 
severe dry year (2011). First, from a qualitative perspective, the relationships between agents’ 
bidding behaviors and the performance of the water market show similar patterns for all of the 
hydrological conditions. In general, TCP, RMP, and TTW increase when   decreases and/or 
when   increases. This implies that agents with smaller rent seeking and/or larger learning rates 
will make the agents bid prices that are closer to their reservation prices, and, as a result, cause the 
water market to yield more benefits overall (e.g., trade more water and increase more crop 
production). The results concur with the need to design effective auction mechanisms that could 
give market participants incentives to bid their true value [Vickrey, 1961; Hailu and Thoyer, 2006; 





Second, from a quantitative perspective, changes in bidding behaviors (  and   ) will 
result in different rates of changes in the performance of the water market. When   is large and/or 
 is small, the modeling results are more sensitive to the changes in  . For example, the relative 
market performance is 20% when 0.1 and 0   . With a small increase in   from 0 to 0.05, 
the relative market performance can increase from 20% to 80%. In contrast, when 0.8  , the 
relative market performance will reach 80% when   exceeds 0.3. These results highlight that the 
market performance depends on hydrological conditions (i.e., dry and wet years), market 
institutions (i.e., model A and model B2), as well as human behaviors (i.e.,  and   ) in markets 
[Smith, 1982; Gode and Sunder, 1993].    
 
Figure 4.7 The impacts of learning rate on: total crop production in 2007 (a), 2010 (b), and 2011 
(c); relative market performance in 2007 (d), 2010 (e), and 2011 (f); and total traded water permit 





In the proposed water market, agents are able to make bid decisions and update their bid 
strategies each day. This allows for simulating daily dynamics in the market and evaluating how 
the market dynamics are affected by agents’ behaviors. Figure 4.8 shows the impacts of agents’ 
learning rate on the dynamics of agents’ rent seeking, bidding price, and cumulative traded water 
in the market under different hydrological conditions. The results show that the agents’ daily rent 
seeking, bidding price, and traded water permit allocations are all affected by  . In general, the 
market dynamics are more noticeable when   increases, resulting in more rapid changes in 
agents’ rent seeking and bidding prices, as well as more traded water in the market. In addition, 
the impacts of   on the market dynamics become more significant in drier conditions (e.g., 2011), 






Figure 4.8 The impacts of learning rate on: agents’ average rent seeking in 2007 (a), 2010 (b), and 
2011 (c); agents’ average bidding price in 2007 (d), 2010 (e), and 2011 (f); and cumulative total 
traded water in the market in 2007 (g), 2010 (h), and 2011 (i).  
Figures 8a-c show that the buyers’ and sellers’ degrees of rent seeking are constant in the 
early days of the simulation and then have a declining trend in later periods. The sellers’ rent 






On the first several days, no agents enter the market to buy water permits because all of 
them have sufficient water permits. Thus, the agents are not able to update their rent seeking 
without transaction information from the market. After a certain number of days (e.g., 10 days in 
Figure 4.8b), some agents with limited water permits will enter the market to buy water permits 
after they have used all of their permits, and the agents’ will update rent seeking as transactions 
occur. At the beginning, sellers outnumber buyers in the market. Under this relatively 
disadvantageous situation, the sellers will decrease rent seeking greatly in order to make their bids 
more competitive in the market. This is more noticeable in drier hydrological conditions (Figure 
4.8c). However, the sellers are in a more advantageous situation under drier hydrological 
conditions when more agents need to buy water permits. Therefore, the sellers’ rent seeking will 
be closer to that of the buyers.  
The daily dynamics of water price (Figures 8d-f) show that the agents’ bidding prices 
between 50 to 70 days (i.e., flowering stage for corn) are higher than on the rest of the days. This 
is consistent with the trend of yield response factor for corn. Corn’s yield response factor during 
the flowering stage is much higher than in other stages, implying that soil water deficit will cause 
larger yield loss during the flowering stage, thus making the marginal benefits of water higher. 
The agents will bid higher prices in response to the high marginal benefits of water at this stage. 
In addition, it is noticed that the agents with large   bid prices more conservatively (i.e., buyers 
bid higher prices and sellers bid lower prices) for all of the scenarios.  
4.4.3 Impacts of Irrigation Behavior 
This section evaluates the impact of the agents’ irrigation behavior, which is modeled using 
the parameter  (sensitivity to soil water deficit). Figure 4.9 summarizes all of the simulation 





TCP increases as  decreases. Agents with smaller   are more sensitive to soil water deficit c
D
and tend to irrigate crops even before cD  reaches its critical level. Therefore, agents with small
will take more risk-averse irrigation schedules that reduce the chance of crops experiencing water 
deficit, leading to higher crop production.  
Comparing model B1 (baseline) with model A (or model B2), it is noticed that the potential 
performance of the water market increases when   decreases and/or the weather is drier. For 
example, Figure 4.9 shows that in 2010 the water market has the potential to increase crop 
production by 0.1 million bushels (i.e., from 2.64 to 2.74 million bushels) when   is 0.6. 
However, the water market can only increase crop production by 0.05 million bushels (i.e., from 
2.45 to 2.50 million bushels) when  is 1.4. In 2011, the impacts of  on the potential 
performance of the water market become more significant (e.g., the water market has the potential 
to increase crop production by 0.15 and 0.09 million bushels when  is 1.4 and 0.6, respectively). 
In contrast, in wet years such as 2007, the potential benefit of the water market is quite limited 
because the crop production can be maintained at a relatively high level with sufficient 
precipitation.  
 





4.4.4 Interplay of Multiple Behavioral Parameters  
While agents’ bidding and irrigation behaviors are investigated separately in the previous 
sections, this section examines how the three behavioral parameters jointly affect the water market 
(Figure 4.10). The results show that the impact of one particular behavioral parameter on the water 
market highly depends on the settings of the other parameters, which can be categorized into three 
patterns.  
The first pattern is that changing the value of one parameter will alter the active parameter 
of the model, without changing the potential impacts of the parameters on the water market 
(Figures 10a-c). (Here we define a parameter as an active parameter if the model results change 
dramatically when the value of this parameter changes. In other words, model results are sensitive 
to this parameter.) This pattern applies for the relationship between   and the interplay of
 and   . When   is small, the ICP is sensitive to the change of   ; while the change of   does 
not have much impact. However, when  is large,   becomes an active parameter while   
becomes inactive.  
The second pattern is that changing the value of one parameter makes one of the other two 
parameters more active. The potential joint impacts of these two parameters does not change 
significantly (Figure 4.10g-i). This pattern applies for the relationship between   and the interplay 
of  and   . When   is small,   is an important model parameter that affects ICP; while   is not 
as important compared with  . However, when   is large,   also becomes an important 
parameter in affecting ICP.  
 The third pattern is that changing the value of one parameter does not qualitatively change 
the interplay of the other two parameters. Instead, the magnitude of the potential impacts of the 





the interplay of   and  . The trend of the interplay between   and   is consistent for different 
values for , and only the magnitude of the interplay changes. When  is small (large), the potential 
joint impacts of   and   on ICP is large (small).  
 
Figure 4.10 The interplay of the three behavioral parameters in 2011  
Lastly, we evaluate how hydrological conditions affect the interplay of the behavioral 
parameters (Figure 4.11) and the impact of transaction cost on the modeling results (Figure 4.12). 
Compared with the results in Figure 4.10, notice that the three patterns discussed above are 





qualitatively change interactions among the behavioral parameters. However, the magnitude of the 
interplay among the parameters depends largely on hydrological conditions. Typically, the 
interplay of the behavioral parameters is more significant in dry conditions than that in wet 
conditions. The sensitivity analysis of the transaction cost shows that, as expected, total crop 
production is lower (i.e., fewer water permits are traded in the market) when transaction cost 
increases. In particular, high degree of rent seeking and high transaction cost cause the trade 
transactions to be low (Figure 4.12).  
 
Figure 4.11 The interplay of the behavioral parameters under different hydrological conditions. 







Figure 4.12 Total crop production under different levels of transaction costs  
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Policy Implications  
Some insights on implementing and improving the water market can be obtained from the 
results. The previous analysis shows that farmers’ irrigation and bidding behaviors can 
significantly affect the performance of the water market. Thus, it is important for policy makers to 
consider these factors when implementing water markets. Some studies have shown that farmers’ 
irrigation decisions are complex and can be affected by their perceptions, experiences, and social 
network [van Duinen et al., 2015]. Appropriate educational and information dissemination 
programs, as well as effective social networking, can support farmers in making better irrigation 





real-time soil moisture status) to guide their irrigation decisions before the water deficit reaches 
critical levels. The programs could also educate farmers to be more realistic (i.e., considering lower 
degree of rent seeking) and more adaptive in learning when making bids in the market. Rewards 
from transactions can also provide incentives to use moderate rent seeking when making bids.  
The results of this study may also provide insights for policy makers to identify appropriate 
education programs towards behavior changes. For example, the irrigation parameter    has 
greater impact on ICP than the learning rate coefficient  when  is small and  is large (e.g., 
0,  1.4    in Figure 4.10g). This implies that an education program for crop science and 
irrigation engineering might be more beneficial than a water-trading education program for 
farmers with low sensitivity to soil water deficits and low rent seeking. However, the opposite 
conclusion will hold true when  is large (e.g., 0.8,  =0.2   in Figure 4.10i). These behavior 
parameter thresholds are obtained from a hypothetical case study, and need to be tested with real 
world water markets. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis with different hydrological conditions 
suggests that timely education programs during dry years will be more beneficial given that 
farmers’ behaviors can have greater impacts on the water market in dry years than in normal or 
wet years.  
4.5.2 Limitations and Future Directions  
The ABM presented in this study is subject to many assumptions and simplifications due 
to data incompleteness and the scope of this work. This study is not intended to provide a tool 
ready for real-world use at this stage, but focuses on exploring the impacts of multiple behaviors 
on the performance of a particular form of water market based on double auction. Several future 
directions can lead to improvement of this work. First, due to the lack of empirical data on farmers’ 





independent from hydrological, institutional, and socioeconomic factors. This assumption might 
not hold true because farmers’ behaviors, in reality, might be affected by factors such as limits in 
water availability [Foster et al., 2014] and social interactions with other farmers[Ng et al., 2011; 
van Duinen et al., 2016]. Further studies are therefore needed to refine the distributions of 
behavioral parameters and to explore the relationships among farmers’ behavioral parameters and 
the associated hydrological, institutional, and socioeconomic conditions. This can be achieved by 
surveys, interviews, and expert knowledge [Smajgl et al., 2011].  
Second, the agricultural system in this study is a simplified system, in which we assume, 
for illustrative purposes, the most widely planted crop (i.e., corn) is planted in all of the agents’ 
croplands. In future work, a crop choice model could be used to simulate agricultural systems 
consisting of multiple crops and to simulate farmers’ crop choice decisions at the beginning of 
each crop-planting season. Third, in this study we only incorporate three behavioral parameters in 
farmers’ decision-making processes in the water market. Some other factors, such as weather 
forecast, crop price and externalities (e.g., water quality), can also affect farmers’ choice of crops 
and irrigation decisions. Incorporating these additional components into the model could better 
mimic the performance of agricultural water markets. However, it is not expected that these 
additional components would qualitatively alter the findings and implications of this study. 
Finally, this study only simulates agricultural water use in the river basin, without taking 
account of other water users (e.g., municipal and industrial water uses). Thus, we assume that 
farmers are allowed to use water as long as their water use is less than their water permits. 
However, during extreme drought conditions, some farmers might not be able to use water if they 
have lower water right priority compared with other water users such as municipal water users 





in the case study area, we only consider trade of surface water permits in the current study. Future 
work could couple the presented model with a hydrological river flow model to simulate the 
impacts of groundwater use and other types of water uses on the water market. This will allow for 
better understanding of the impacts of farmers’ behaviors on agricultural water markets. In 
addition, the current study only considers a specific type of water market (i.e., sealed-bid double 
auction). Under this market mechanism, agents’ bidding price and bidding strategies are 
confidential. In other words, agents do not share their bidding information with other agents. 
Future work can extend the scope of the current study and simulate other types of water markets 
(e.g., open-cry auction market) in which agents can observe others’ behaviors and interact with 
each other.  
4.6 Conclusions 
An agent-based model of farmers’ irrigation and bidding decisions under the influence of 
farmers’ behavioral factors is developed to simulate an agricultural water market based on double 
auction. The model is applied to a hypothetical water market designed for the agricultural system 
of the Guadalupe River Basin in Texas. The results demonstrate that farmers’ behaviors can 
significantly affect the performance of the water market, as summarized below:   
1. Among multiple behavioral parameters (i.e., sensitivity to soil water deficit  , rent 
seeking , and learning rate  ), the water market’s potential is only significantly affected by .  
2. The impact of  on the performance of the water market is significant under most cases. 
However, the impact of   or   depends on the other two parameters. When   is larger,   
has greater impacts on the performance of the water market; in contrast, when   is larger,   has 





3. The water market could significantly increase crop production only when the following 
conditions are satisfied: (1)   is small, and (2)  is small and/or   is large. The first condition 
requires efficient irrigation scheduling. The second condition requires well-developed water 
market institutions that provide incentives to bid true valuations of water permits.  
Thus, farmers’ sensitivity to soil water deficit and hydrological conditions constrain the 
potential performance of the water market. Farmers who are more sensitive to soil dryness, 
especially under drier hydrological conditions, will enhance the market potential. However, 
farmers’ bidding behaviors will eventually determine how much of the market potential can be 
obtained. Water markets will perform better when farmers are willing to accept smaller rent 
seeking in making bids, and when they are able to learn and update their bidding strategies quickly. 
The latter highlights the importance of sharing market information with agents in timely manner, 
as well as designing effective auction mechanisms so that agents are more willing to bid their true 
valuations of water permits [Krishna, 2010]. Although these findings are derived from a 
hypothetical case study, they provide meaningful hypotheses for further research on the impacts 
of individual behaviors on water markets.  
It is important to note that, this study simulates a hypothetical water market. In order to 
implement water markets in the real world, there are many institutional, regulatory, and technical 
issues to concern. These include strong legal systems to define water rights and to address the 
conflicts in water trading, engineering infrastructure for water transfer and storage, stakeholders’ 
participation, and third-party effects. Incorporating these factors into the proposed model would 
make the model more realistic. We envision that the proposed water market framework can be 
useful for future development of water markets and for testing the findings when water market 





Chapter V. Conclusions and Future Work   
The previous three chapters address three issues associated with modeling human 
behaviors in the management of floods and droughts. This chapter summarizes the main findings 
obtained from the modeling results (Section 5.1) and discusses the limitations and future directions 
of the thesis (Section 5.2). 
5.1 Conclusions  
This thesis assesses the impacts of human behaviors on the performance of water resource 
systems during extreme hydrological events. Using an agent-based (ABM) modeling approach, 
three issues associated with modeling human behaviors are addressed: (1) agents’ behavioral 
heterogeneity, (2) social interaction, and (3) interplay of multiple behaviors. Two types of extreme 
hydrological events, drought and flooding, are used as case studies.  
In Chapter II, an ABM framework is developed to simulate human behavioral 
heterogeneity in response to flood warnings. The framework is coupled with a traffic model to 
simulate agents’ evacuation processes within a road network under various flood-warning 
scenarios. The results show that the marginal benefit associated with providing better flood 
warnings (i.e., flood warnings with high prediction accuracies and/or longer lead times) is 
significantly constrained if people behave in a more risk-tolerant manner, especially in high-
density residential areas. The results also show significant impacts of human behavioral 
heterogeneity on the benefits of flood warnings, and thus highlight the importance of considering 
human behavioral heterogeneity in simulating flood warning-response systems. The results reveal 
the importance of modeling human behavioral heterogeneity, as well as including more attributes 





Chapter III extends the framework developed in Chapter II, and evaluates how social 
communication affects agents’ flood risk awareness and evacuation behaviors. The results show 
that agents’ social communication can make the evacuation process more sensitive to the influence 
of global flood warnings and/or neighbor observations, and thus impose uncertainties in the benefit 
of flood warnings. In particular, when social media become more influential, and individuals have 
less trust in global flood warnings, the evacuation process can be more vulnerable (i.e., evacuation 
rate is lower). Stubborn individuals on social media are shown to significantly hinder the speed 
and level of opinion adoption of the entire group. These results highlight the role of social media 
in flood evacuation and the need to monitor social media so that misinformation can be corrected 
in a timely manner during a disaster evacuation process.  
Chapter IV addresses the issues of simulating multiple behaviors, using drought as a case 
study. The ABM explicitly incorporates farmers’ multiple behaviors, namely irrigation behavior 
(represented by farmers’ sensitivity to soil water deficit) and bidding behavior (represented by 
farmers’ rent seeking and learning rate), in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. 
It is found that the joint impacts of the behavioral parameters on the water market are strong and 
complex. In particular, irrigation behavior affects the water market potential and its impacts on the 
performance of the water market are significant under most scenarios. The water market could 
significantly increase crop production only when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) farmers 
are sensitive to soil water deficit, and (2) rent seeking is small and/or learning rate is large. The 
first condition requires efficient irrigation scheduling, and the second requires well-developed 
water market institutions that provide incentives to bid true valuation of water permits.  
Overall, the results from the three case studies show that ABM is a useful modeling 





in the management of floods and droughts, this thesis investigates some specific issues associated 
with modeling human behaviors. However, ABM typically faces difficulty in model validation 
due to lack of data, which imposes challenges in implementing ABM for planning and 
management of water resource systems. In the big data era, with advanced data collection 
technologies and data mining tools, more data on human behaviors in water resource systems can 
be collected and analyzed. These will provide great opportunities for implementing ABM in the 
management of real-world extreme hydrological events. The following section specifically 
introduces other limitations of this thesis and recommended future work.  
5.2 Limitations and Future Work  
 The major challenge for simulating human behaviors with an ABM is the lack of empirical 
data. Thus, more data are needed to verify the modeling results presented in the above three 
chapters. More specific limitations and future research related to this work are discussed as 
follows.  
 In the case of human behaviors in flood warning-evacuation systems (the ABM in Chapter 
II), relationships between agents’ risk tolerance thresholds and their socioeconomic and 
demographic conditions are not represented. In fact, agents’ response to flood warnings could be 
affected by these factors, such as the size of household, economic value of the home, pet 
ownership, etc. Future work should consider connections among these factors, and build models 
that could better simulate agents’ evacuation decisions. Second, in the present work, we assume 
that all of the agents remaining in the area at the end of model execution will be flooded, and the 
agents that have evacuated to the safe area before the end of model execution will not be flooded. 
Thus, we did not specify the direction, speed, or timing of the flood inundation processes. In future 





flood behaviors in the real world. In particular, we can consider the heterogeneity of flood damages 
at different locations within a residential area, and evaluate how the spatial distribution of flood 
inundation affects the modeling results. Finally, in the current study, the benefit of flood warnings 
is measured by the percentage of agents that successfully evacuate to safe area. Future work can 
introduce more criteria to measure the benefit of flood warnings, such as the economic value of 
flood-damage mitigation.  
 In Chapter III, due to lack of agents’ social interaction data, we assume agents who are 
closer to each other have stronger social connections and tend to have more communications. This 
might agree with intuitive reasoning that individuals living closer to each other will have more 
chance to meet each other and exchange information. However, this assumption does not 
necessarily hold true in some real-world case studies. Future work could refine this assumption by 
mapping individuals’ social connections using advanced data mining tools when social 
communication data become available. Second, this present work considers a special case of 
regular lattice transportation network with only one evacuation destination at a specific location 
(i.e., on the corner of the transportation network). Future work could consider other types of traffic 
network structures and more evacuation destinations in the transportation system. The problem of 
shelter allocation during natural disasters has been investigated in many previous studies. It would 
be interesting to investigate the role of social media in shelter-allocation optimization to extend 
the scope of this work.  Third, in the current work, we only simulate the process in which agents 
share their opinions on flood risk, without considering that agents could also share their risk-
tolerance thresholds. Future work can investigate how agents’ risk-tolerance thresholds are 





 Both chapter II and chapter III use synthetic residential areas as case studies. Future work 
can extend the scope of the current study and use real-world residential areas as example [Dawson 
et al., 2011]. This requires a variety of field data, including (1) census data that provide information 
on the population in the community, their risk-tolerance thresholds to flood risk, responses to 
different types of information sources, access to transport during floods, etc., (2) transportation 
network that connects households to evacuation destinations in the residential area, and (3) 
information on flood warning systems during flood events. Implementing the current model in a 
real-world case study can provide more realistic simulation of households’ evacuation processes 
during floods.        
In the case of the agricultural water market (Chapter IV), the ABM is also subject to many 
assumptions and simplifications due to data incompleteness. First, due to the lack of empirical data 
on farmers’ behaviors, the agents’ behavioral parameters are assumed to be normally distributed, 
and are independent from hydrological, institutional, and socioeconomic factors. This assumption 
might not hold true because farmers’ behaviors, in reality, might be affected by factors such as 
limits in water availability and social interactions with other farmers. Further studies are therefore 
needed to refine the distributions of behavioral parameters and to explore the relationships among 
farmers’ behavioral parameters and the associated hydrological, institutional, and socioeconomic 
conditions. Second, the agricultural system in this study is a simplified system, in which we 
assume, for illustrative purposes, the most widely planted crop (i.e., corn) is planted in all of the 
agents’ croplands. In future work, a crop choice model could be used to simulate agricultural 
systems consisting of multiple crops and to simulate farmers’ crop choice decisions at the 
beginning of each crop-planting season. Third, the present work simulates a hypothetical water 





strong legal systems to define water rights and to address the conflicts in water trading, engineering 
infrastructure for water transfer and storage, stakeholders’ participation, and third-party effects. 
Incorporating these factors into the proposed model would make the model more realistic.  
Finally for either of the extreme hydrological events (i.e., droughts and floods), future work 
can couple a more realistic hydro-climatic model that provide forecast of an extreme event to an 
ABM. Furthermore, economic experiments and surveys can be conducted to obtain data on agents’ 
behaviors, and build more realistic models to simulate the role of human behaviors in the 
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This section introduces the N-S traffic model. In the N-S model, space and time are both 
discrete variables and each traffic road in the transportation network is divided into cells, each of 
which can be occupied by one vehicle. At each time step, the moving speed and the location of a 
vehicle is constrained by: (1) the moving speed of the vehicle, (2) the acceleration and deceleration 
rate, (3) the number of empty cells in front of the vehicle to avoid collusion, and (4) maximum 
moving speed allowed in the transportation network.  
For vehicle i and vehicle j (the vehicle that is ahead of vehicle i) with traveling speed 
iv and 
jv , respectively, the speed of vehicle i is determined by the following rules for each time step: 
o If the distance between vehicle i and vehicle j is greater than a safe distance, the vehicle 
will accelerate, increasing moving speed by a unit. Since there is a speed limit on each 
edge, the vehicle’s moving speed would not exceed the road's maximum limit speed. 
o If the distance between vehicle i and vehicle j is less than a safe distance, the vehicle will 
decrease its moving speed by a unit. 
o A vehicle will randomly change its speed by one unit with a certain probability. 
o At the end of each time step, a vehicle will move one time step and update its location on 
its current route. 
We apply the all-way stop rule in road intersections. Vehicles must stop when arriving at 
road intersections and proceed only when the way ahead is clear. When multiple vehicles approach 
at the same road intersection, vehicles’ right-of-way to proceed follows the order of their arriving 
times (Figure A1). For details of the N-S model and how it is implemented to simulate agents’ 
evacuation process, see  Nagel and Schreckenberg, [1992], Nagel and Rickert, [2001], and Du et 






Figure A1 Illustration of traffic road in the N-S model. The road are divided into a number of cells. 
Each cell can be occupied by one agent at a time. Each agent has a designated cell to start 
evacuation (the closest one to the agent). An agent will start its evacuate process when (1) it decides 
to evacuate (illustrated by red color such as agent 1 and agent 3), and (2) its designated cell is 
currently not occupied by other agents (agent 1 will start evacuation immediately; while agent 3 








This section briefly introduces the water balance approach and derivation of the marginal 
benefit for irrigation used in the agent-based model. Following previous studies, we use a simple, 
linear water-crop production function to calculate the reduction in crop yield when crop yield 
reduction is caused by water stress, as shown in equation B1[Allen et al., 1998; Steduto et al., 










    (B1) 
where aY  and mY  are crop yield (bushel/acre) with and without water stress, respectively. yk is 
crop’s yield response factor, which is a dimensionless parameter that measures the effect of 
evapotranspiration reduction on crop yield loss.
cET  is evapotranspiration for the crop (i.e., corn in 
this study) under standard management conditions without water shortage (
0c cET ET k  ). 0ET  is the 
reference evapotranspiration calculated by Hargreaves equation [Hargreaves and Samani, 1985].
adjET  
is adjusted evapotranspiration as a result of water stresses (
adj c sET ET k  ). ck  
is crop 
coefficient factor and sk  
is a dimensionless evapotranspiration reduction factor dependent on 
available soil water ( [0,1]sk  ).  sk  












where AWC is the capacity of available water in crop root zone (inch of water/inch of soil), which 
is the difference between field capacity and wilting point. The value of AWC corresponding to 
different soil types can be obtained from Allen et al. [1998].  MAD is crop depletion factor, a 





soil without suffering water stress. MAD is set as 0.6 for corn [Allen et al., 1998]. Drz is the depth 
of the root zone (inch). Dc is soil water deficit (inch) that needs to be satisfied from irrigation. We 
adopt the water balance approach to simulate the hydrological process in crop root zone  [Allen et 
al., 1998; Andales et al., 2011]. In the water balance approach, soil water deficit Dc can be 
estimated by equation B3:  
 ,c c p adj
I
D D ET P
CA
     (B3) 
where c, pD  is soil water deficit of the previous day (inch). P is precipitation amount (inch). I is 
farmers’ effective irrigation amount after taking account of water loss due to irrigation efficiency 
and leaching fraction for salinity control (acre-inch). CA is crop area (acre).  
We assume crop yield of the entire crop-growing season is a linear combination of the 
hypothetical crop yield on each individual day t [ , , ,( / )m t y t y t m
t
Y k k Y  ]. Denote irrigation cost 
($/acre-inch), crop planting cost ($/acre), and crop price as IC, C and PC, respectively. Crop profit 
( ) of the entire season is represented by equation B4:  
 aY CA PC IC I C CA         (B4) 
Combining equations B1-4, the marginal benefit (
tMB ) for irrigating crop on day t ($/acre-
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 (B5) 
In the auction market, we assume transaction between each individual pair of buyer and 
seller is associated with a transaction cost. In this study, we use coefficient of transaction cost (





for a transaction with trading price p and trade amount Q, transaction cost can be represented by 
p Q  ). A larger   is associated with a higher transaction cost ( (0,  1) ).  
With transaction cost, buyers (sellers) will need to decrease (increase) their reservation 
prices in order to avoid profit-losing transactions. The reservation price (
,i t ) for agent i on day t 
is then set as 
, / (1 )i tMB   for buying water permits or , / (1 )i tMB   for selling water permits, 
which could ensure the agent will not lose profit if its bid results in transactions. Note that high 
transaction cost will increase sellers’ reservation prices (decreases buyers’ reservation prices) and 
therefore reduce the number of transactions in the market.   
The development for corn consists of five stages, which are establishment, vegetative, 
flowering, yield formation, and ripening. Yield response factor yk for these stages are 0.2, 0.4, 
1.15, 0.5, and 0.2, respectively. The duration for these stages are 20, 30, 20, 40, and 23 days, 
respectively (133 days in total) [Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979; Wang and Cai, 2009]. In order to 
adjust it to 140 days (from March 16th to August 2nd) in this study, the numbers of days for the five 







Figure B1 The total amount of precipitation from 2001 to 2013 in the Guadalupe river basin 
(GRB). Year 2007 is a wet year for GRB, with 3.7×104 acre-feet (20.4 inches) of rainfall during 
the crop-growing season for all of the agents. In comparison, year 2011 is a severe dry year and 
the total precipitation is only 4.8×103 acre-feet (2.64 inches). The total precipitation in year 2010 
falls in the middle of years 2007 and 2011. Therefore, these three years are selected as 
representative wet, severe dry and normal years in the case study.  
 
